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1 Introduction
1.1 Earlier studies
The term “entrepreneur,” of french origin, appeared first in the writings of Richard 
Cantillon, a banker of Irish extraction who made fortune in Paris at the beginning 
of the 18th century. Cantillon saw the entrepreneur as someone with the foresight 
an willingness to assume risks and to take actions required to make profits. It 
was precisely that continuous search for profit opportunities what, according to 
Cantillon, turned the entrepreneur into the equilibrium force in the market.
Adam Smith failed to single out entrepreneurs from what he called in his master 
work the “industrious people.” A later economist, Jeremy Bentham, criticised 
Smith’s laws against usury as discriminating against entrepreneurs undertaking 
new projects. Bentham argued in his Defence of Usury, published in 1789, that 
new projects were characterised by their riskyness. Therefore, the ceilings imposed 
upon interest rates by law were difficulting the access to finance of such projects 
and, therefore, the activity of entrepreneurs.1
Frank Knight and Joseph Schumpeter are perhaps the two economists who, 
already in the 20th century, have made the most valuable contribution to the field 
of entrepreneurship by defining the role of the entrepreneur within the economic 
system. Although their points of view about who the entrepreneur is differed, their 
work was specially important because it placed the entrepreneur at centre stage.
Frank Knight [1921] emphasised the role of the entrepreneur as the bearer 
of true uncertainty. He distinguished between insurable risks and uninsurable 
uncertainly. Risks are characterised by a known probability distribution. Uncertainty, 
on the other hand, is due to outcomes that can be listed but for whom the attached
probability is not known. This distinction helps to sort entrepreneurs, as the
1For a comprehensive history of entrepreneurship, please refer to the work of H6bert and Link 
[1982].
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ultimate bearers of uninsurable uncertainty, from managers:
The only risk which leads to entrepreneurial profit is a unique uncertainty 
resulting from an exercise of ultimate responsibility which in its very 
nature cannot be insured nor capitalised nor salaried. (Knight 1921, 
page 310).
Joseph Schumpeter was probably the first economist who put forward that, 
far from being an equilibrating force in the market after a shock, entrepreneurial 
activity was the origin of the shock. Schumpeter’s starting point is a circular 
flow: an unchanging economic process which flows on at constant rates in time 
and merely reproduces itself. In this stationary economy the entrepreneur does 
not exist. Only managers carrying out input-output calculations have a role to 
play. In a moment of time, a “revolutionary change” takes place. That change is 
manifested by the pursue of new combinations of the factor of production which, 
according to Schumpeter, represented an innovation: “if instead of quantities of 
factors, we vary the form of the production function, we have an innovation” 
(Hubert and Link 1982, page 78). The individuals whose function was to carry the 
innovations were called entrepreneurs.
The innovation process was seen by Schumpeter as the precursor of development; 
the force behind development were the entrepreneurs. He was quite alone in 
his claim. Since the mid-1930s, the orthodox economic theory had removed the 
entrepreneur from its explanatory structure. According to Barreto [1989], one 
reason for this can be found in the development of the modem theory of the firm, 
best described as a movement toward the integration of the isoquant, output and 
factor market sides into a cohesive model. The integration of all the three sides 
required a set of assumptions that effectively excluded the entrepreneurial role.
The three main postulates of the theory were: (1) the existence of a production
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function, which gave the firm complete understanding of all the input-output 
possibilities; (2) rational choice by which the firm rationally pursued its objectives, 
namely, profit maximisation; and finally, (3) perfect information which meant 
that each firm was aware of all considerations affecting its decisions. Given these 
assumptions, it is easy to understand that the role of the entrepreneur as innovator, 
uncertainty-bearer, coordinator and arbitrageur was effectively removed from the 
theory.
1.2 T he re-em ergence o f entrepreneurship
The removal of the entrepreneur from the economic analysis was consistent with 
the conviction of economists that large firms, where the entrepreneurial role is 
diluted, were the cornerstone of the economic and employment growth. However, 
since some twenty years, the centre-stage of the economic debate has slowly shifted 
towards the small business sector, where entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship, understood 
as the creation and growth of new firms, are at the centre of interest.
This is exemplified in the founding of the Small Business Administration in 
USA and the launch of the European Commission reports on the status and 
contributions of European SMEs. It is particularly noteworthy that the OECD 
Jobs Study [1994] suggested the need of a business climate conducive to encouraging 
business start-ups, since this was considered an important source of job creation.
This suggestion was further emphasised in the 1998 OECD manuscript entitled 
“Fostering Entrepreneurship”. The European Commission issued similar recommendations 
in its 1998 Action Plan for Employment.
This surge of interest in small business economics and entrepreneurship, particularly 
among policy-makers, during the 1980s can be largely attributed to two simultaneous 
and related events: the well-documented shift in economic activity away from large 
firms to small, predominantly young, enterprises during the 1970s and 1980s; and
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David Birch’s revolutionary finding that small businesses create a disproportionately 
large share of new jobs.
1.2.1 The increasing econom ic im portance o f small firms
There is ample evidence that economic activity moved away from large firms in 
the 70s and 80s. The most impressive and cited of it is the drop in the share of 
the 500 largest American firms (Fortune 500) in employment: from 20% in 1970 
to 8.5% in 1996. Table 1, taken from Acs and Audretsch [1993], shows the small 
firms share of manufacturing employment and its shift over time across a selection 
of countries (small firms are defined a bit broadly: those with 500 employees or 
less). The numbers do not reflect the real shift since they show only what has 
happened in the manufacturing sector, where the average firm size is larger than 
that in the service sector.
Country Year Small firm emp. share Year Small firm emp. share Change
UK 1979 30.1 1986 39.9 +9.8 '
W. Germany 1970 54.8 1987 57.9 +3.1
USA 1976 33.4 1987 35.2 +1.9
Netherlands 1978 36.1 1986 39.9 +3.8
Italy 1981 52.8 1987 61.8 +9
Portugal 1982 68.3 1986 71.8 +3.5
Netherlands refers to firms with 100 or less employees and Italy to firms with 200 or less 
Source: Acs and Audretsch [1993], Table 12.1
Thble 1: Small firm share of manufacturing employment
In all countries, without exception, small firms’ share of employment has increased 
over the past decades. What is not so clear is why this shift has taken place. Early 
works like Carlsson [1992] or Acs [1992] explain it as the result of three major 
changes in the world economy since the early 1970s. The first one is the intensified
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global competition, mainly from low-cost Eastern Europe and Asian countries, 
resulting from the development in transportation, information and communication 
technologies. Some firms have responded to this increase in competition shifting 
production out of high-cost locations to low-cost ones, which can explain the wave 
of corporate downsizing of the last two decades. Besides, technological changes, 
such as those that have decreased computer costs, have reduced optimal firm size 
and the minimum scale of entry.
The second major change has been the increase in the degree of uncertainty, 
reflected in a significant growth slowdown in all industrial countries triggered by 
the oil price shocks of the 1970s and exarcebated by the volatility of exchange rates. 
Piore and Sable [1984] and Brock and Evans [1990] claim that the instability of 
markets has resulted in the demise of mass production and has promoted flexible 
production, a comparative advantage of small firms over their large counter parts. 
Flexible production has also been a crucial advantage of small firms given the 
third major economic change, namely, the intensified market fragmentation due to 
growing consumer demand for differentiated products.
More recently, Audretsch [1995], Audretsch and Thurik [2001] and Acs and 
Audretsch [2001] have suggested that increased globalization and the technological 
revolution have shifted the comparative advantage towards a knowledge-based 
economic activity. In such economy, the focus is on the individual as possessor of 
knowledge rather than on the firm. It is argued that asymmetric information and 
uncertainty about the future value of the knowledge result in its different valuation 
by firm and individual. This situation can lead to the departure of the individual 
from the incumbent firm in order to launch a new firm where her knowledge can be 
commercialized. That is, entrepreneurship is taking a new importance because it 
serves as a key mechanism by which knowledge created in one organization (such 
as a university or an incumbent firm) becomes commercialized in a new firm.
10
While the causes of the shift of economic activity to small businesses are not 
very clear, its consequences are. As Acs [1992] puts it, small businesses turn to be 
agents of change, source of innovative activity and stimulation of industry evolution 
and, therefore, the source of an important share of newly generated jobs.
1.2.2 The contribution to  em ploym ent growth o f small firms: Birch’s 
revolutionary findings
Prior to 1979, labour economists had analysed published labour statistics for many 
years and consistently found that most new jobs were created by firms in the largest 
size classes. The analysis was done by counting the number of jobs in each size 
class in the current time period and subtracting the number of jobs in the same 
size class in a previous period. The assumption behind this methodology was that 
inter-class movement of firms was negligible.
In the mid-1970s David Birch, a young MIT researcher, received a grant from 
the Economic Development Administration to study how the movement of firms 
across state boundaries affected employment growth. Birch created a new database 
from the Dun Sz Bradstreet records of firms attempting to establish credit with 
other firms or seeking credit information. He classified firms according to their 
size and location in the base year, 1969, and measured its individual location 
and employment behaviour in each succeeding wave of data (four in total) until 
1976. The database contained around 80% of all establishments, although the 
very small and/or young firms were under-represented due to the firm registration 
criteria Using this new database, Birch found and reported in 1979 that inter­
state movements of firms were not contributing to overall employment change; and 
that around 80% of net new jobs were created by firms with 100 employees or less 
(Birch 1979: The Job Generation Process. The main results are also in Birch 
1981).
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Birch’s claim that 8 out of 10 net new jobs were created by small firms prompted 
the interest of policy-makers who, in the high unemployment days of the early 80s, 
were interested in new methods for reducing unemployment. In the academic 
world, Birch’ findings where revolutionary at the time. They implied that inter­
class movements (small firms growing until they are classified as large firms) were 
a major factor in determining overall employment growth. Birch also discovered 
that the rates of job losses across regions were pretty similar. Differences in the 
net employment change were due to differences in the job gain rates. In other 
words, rapidly growing areas were replacing lost jobs at 2 or 3 times the rate of the 
declining ones. More importantly, about 80% of the replacement jobs were created 
by establishments that were four years or younger. In Birch’s words:
not all small businesses are job creators. The job creators are the 
relatively few younger ones that start-up and expand rapidly in their 
youth, outgrowing the “small” designation in the process (Birch 1981, 
page 8).
Consequently, Birch recommended “changing the regulating environment in 
ways that the entrepreneurs find attractive.” The release of Birch’s challenging 
results and policy recommendations prompted the US Small Business Administration 
(SBA) to build its own database to test Birch’s results and further develop them. 
The SBA database had data on a representative sample of firms measured at 
two-year intervals from 1976 to 1990. The first research paper analysing the new 
database was that of Armington and Odler [1982]. Applying Birch’s methodology 
for the period 1978-1980, they estimated the small firms contribution to net new 
employment to be around 36%, very far from the sensational 80% found by Birch.
Subsequent research undertaken by Armington and Birch himself uncovered
the relationship between the business cycle and the job generation process.2 They
2See Birch [1987].
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showed that the share of net job creation of small firms decreased during economic 
expansions and increased during recessions. The reason was the volatility of large 
firms’ job creation: large firms tend to increase employment in the late stages of 
expansions and to decrease it in the recessions. The net job creation of small firms 
is on the contrary quite constant, but their share in total net new jobs changes 
with the large firms’ employment fluctuations. This could explain Armington and 
Odle [1982] findings since their period of analysis corresponded to the late stages 
of an expansion. However, the publication of this late explanation of their findings 
received much less attention than their original ones, therefore casting doubts as 
to whether or not small firms really were responsible for the bulk of net new jobs.
In 1990, Brown, Hamilton and Medoff published a book entitled “Employers 
Large and Small” analysing the quality as well as the quantity of jobs created by 
small firms, when compared to those of large firms. They concluded that:
existing small firms do not grow faster than large ones but by an 
accident of birth new firms happen to be born small. Since new businesses 
account for more than 100% of the net increase in employment, and 
new businesses rarely start out with 100 or more employees, it is almost 
inevitable that small firms will account for a disproportionate share of 
new employment (Brown, Hamilton and Medoff 1990, page 24) •
Based on this conclusion, which is obviously hard to refute, and on the well 
established fact that small firms pay lower wages, lower fringe benefits and create 
jobs of shorter duration than large firms, Brown et al. [1990] recommended policy­
makers to concentrate their efforts on the large business sector. But from our point 
of view, if the great job creators are the new firms and some of the new small firms 
of today are the large firms of tomorrow, would it not make more sense to help 
firm creation and survival?
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The most important criticism to Birch’s findings appeared in a 1996 paper by 
Steven Davis, John Haltiwanger and Scott Schuh entitled “Small Business and 
Job Creation: Dissecting the Myths and Reassessing the Facts”. They based their 
analysis on the Longitudinal Research Database on manufacturing firms of the 
USA Bureau of Census. They claimed that Birch‘s results rested on “fallacious 
and misleading interpretations of the data.” (Davis et al. 1996, page 10).
Davis et al. [1996] main criticism was what they called the “regression-to- 
the-mean bias” resulting from the fact that many firms’ employment changes are 
transitory, or in other words, the observed gain or loss is reversed in the short-term.
Hence, at any point in time, the small business sector contains a disproportionate 
number of business that are less than their equilibrium size, and the large business 
sector has firms that are greater. Since businesses that are too small expand 
over time and businesses that are too large contract over time, we might get the 
impression that small businesses are creating most jobs. What is really happening 
is that most of these jobs were created by “large” firms that are “temporarily 
small.”
To avoid the bias, Davis et al. [1996] proposed a new method called the “current 
average size” which took the average size of the firm over a certain period of time 
(they did it from one firm census to the next, i.e. every five years). With this 
method, the regression-to-the-mean bias is dampened but a new problem emerges, 
namely, the outcome variable (employment growth) influences the classification 
variable (firm size). Therefore there is a tendency for growing firms to be classified 
as large and for declining ones as small.
Picot, Baldwin and Dupuy [1994] have performed an exhaustive analysis of 
the small firm job creation using a longitudinal file of Canadian companies from 
all sectors between 1978 and 1992. They have tried different methodologies to 
compute job creation and have concluded that methodology matters to the quantitative
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results, but not to the qualitative ones: small firms seem to contribute disproportionally 
to net employment growth.
Picot et al. [1994] acknowledge that some service sectors are experiencing a 
rapid employment growth which, combined with an above-average share of small 
firms, could contribute to the view that small firms are dominating employment 
growth. To test whether this is the case, they perform a simple decomposition 
exercise and conclude that about one-quarter of the observed change in the distribution 
of employment by size class is due to an industry effect (i.e., to the shift to 
industries that are more small-firm intensive).
Another important contribution of the Picot et al. paper is the estimation of 
the contribution of firm birth to the total small firm sector job creation. They 
calculate that the employment growth between 1981 and 1984 of Canadian firms 
already existing in 1981 was of -14% in the group of very small firms, with 20 or 
less employees, and of -11% in the group of large firms. If the birth of new firms 
and their contribution to employment growth is added, the employment change 
among the very small firms is 12% and that among large ones -9%. This results 
are robust along time. Although Picot et al. [1994] reach a similar conclusion to 
that of Brown, Hamilton and Medoff [1990], their policy recommendations are not 
quite the same:
The results for existing small and large firms are not that dissimilar. It 
is the fact that new firms tend to be small that makes the difference.
This is important when considering policies which are oriented towards 
existing firms, or the creation of new firms (Picot, Baldwin and Dupuy 
1994, page 18).
Methodologies similar to Birch’s have been used in the European context to find 
similar results, see Gallagher and Stewart [1986] and Storey and Johnson [1987]
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for the UK, Heshmati [2001] for Sweden, Hohti [2000] for Finland, and Broesma 
and Gautier [1997] for the Netherlands. Although the evidence was less robust in 
Germany, recent empirical studies suggest that the job creation potential of small 
firms is increasing; see for example Haid and Weigand [1998] for a study on the 
employment generation of family-owned businesses.
In conclusion; the evidence indicates that in the last two decades economic 
activity has shifted from large to small businesses, where the entrepreneurial 
phenomenon is most important. One of the results of that shift is the increasing 
contribution of small firms to job creation. Within the small firm sector, the main 
source of employment is the group of new firms that are bom small, but grow 
rapidly to become large firms.
The fact that they are the main job creators is what makes the analysis of 
the impact of firm creation upon the macroeconomic performance of a country 
necessary. That is precisely the objective of this thesis.
1.3 Definition and m easurem ent
Entrepreneurship is a multidimensional concept. Therefore it is difficult to define 
since its definition will depend on the field of research. The 1998 OECD report 
on entrepreneurship proposes to group all definitions into the following two broad 
categories:
• Entrepreneurship as the description of the creation and growth of new and 
small businesses;
• Entrepreneurship as the description of a more general characteristic, denoting 
the willingness to take risks, to be innovative and to take initiatives to exploit 
business opportunities.
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We are interested in the aggregate employment performance of a country. 
Therefore, we will focus on the first category or definition of entrepreneurship: 
the process of firm creation and growth. But it is important to note that, from a 
theoretical point of view, firm creation is modelled as the result of the occupational 
choice of an individual who decides to become self-employed, starting a new business, 
instead of becoming an employee in an existing firm. That choice depends ultimately 
on how “entrepreneurial” the individual is, that is, on the individual attitude 
towards risk, entrepreneurial ability and so on. Hence, although we are interested 
in the macro consequences of firm creation, we have to look at the individual or 
micro level to study the process by which a new firm is created.
The lack of consensus upon the definition and the only very recent surge of 
interest on the topic makes it difficult to find consistent data on entrepreneurial 
activity. Indicators such as the self-employment rate or the number of small and 
medium firms have been commonly used in the entrepreneurship literature. The 
OECD/ILO defines self-employment, as “persons who during the reference period 
performed some work for profit or family gain, in cash or in kind.” Employers,' 
persons working on own account, unpaid family workers, and members of producers’ 
co-operatives are all counted as self-employed. If we exclude the agricultural sector, 
only the first two groups are of some importance for most OECD countries. The 
most borderline definition case is that of the manager of an incorporated business 
who either owns the business or holds a majority of the shares. In USA, Canada 
or Japan they are usually treated as employees while in most of the rest of OECD 
countries they are included in the self-employment count.
The EIM group in the Netherlands, responsible for the Observatory of European 
SMEs, has constructed the most comprehensive database of business owners building 
upon the OECD data. It is referred to as “Comparative Entrepreneurship Data 
for International Analysis.” The data shows the number of self-employed, with
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or without employees, as a percentage of the labour force. It includes both 
incorporated and unincorporated businesses, but excludes unpaid family workers 
and wage earners operating a side-business as a secondary work activity. It also 
excludes business owners in the agriculture sector.
Yet entrepreneurship, as indicated above, is a dynamic concept; it refers to the 
creation and growth of firms. Business ownership rates might not approximate 
correctly that dynamic process. The cases of Spain and Italy appear perfect 
examples of that. As it can be seen in table 2 below, in spite of having the highest 
business ownership rates among OECD countries, both countries show below- 
average firm start-up rates. Most importantly, they both have a low percentage 
of new firms that intend to grow. One reason can be found in Scarpetta et al.
[2002] who, building on a recent OECD database on firm dynamic, institutions and 
productivity, conclude that existing institutions contribute to the higher business 
churning in the United States, as compared to Europe. In the United States, there 
seems to be more trial-and-error (births and deaths) which could explain that 
surviving firms start in average with less employees but grow much faster than in 
Europe.
Indicators such as start-up activity, net entry rate or turbulence rate come 
closer to the idea we have of the entrepreneurial process. Some efforts to collect 
international longitudinal data sets have been undertaken by Eurostat, in co­
operation with national statistical institutes and DG XXIII. Some years ago they 
launched a periodical study, “Business Demography in Europe,” with the aim of 
improving the information available on entry and exits of firms. But the data are 
not harmonised since they come from different national institutions such as VAT 
statistics, business registers or commercial chambers, which have different criteria 
to count firm entries and exits. Therefore, cross-country comparisons have to be 
done with a lot of caution.
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Perhaps the best source of cross-country data on start-up activity is the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), an international initiative led by the London 
Business School and Babson College. The GEM draws from an extensive population 
survey carried out simultaneously in different countries. The project started in 
1999 with 10 countries, expanded to 29 in 2001 and counted on 37 countries in its 
last published study, in 2002.
There are two measures of entrepreneurial activity. The narrower one is the 
estimated percentage of the adult population involved in the process of starting a 
new business at the moment of the interview (start-ups). A start-up is counted 
when the respondent declares that (1) she/he alone or with others has already 
undertaken some steps towards the creation of a new business, (2) the respondent 
will be the owner or co-owner of the new business and (3), the business has not 
generated any income yet. The last criterium is to distinguish between start-ups 
and very young businesses.
There is a broader measure of entrepreneurial activity, called Total Entrepreneurial 
Activity or TEA, which includes those involved in the start-up process and th e ' 
owners of very young businesses (of less than 42 months). Table 2 shows the TEA 
and start-up prevalence rates for 2002 for most of the OECD countries. The table 
also shows the percentage of adults starting a business with clear growth intentions 
(intending to create 20 or more jobs over the course of 5 years). For the sake of 
comparison we also include the business ownership rates for 1998 taken from the 
EIM studies.
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Country Start-ups 02 TEA 02 High-growth SUps 02 B.Ownership rate 98
Australia' • 3.8 8.7 1.5 15.5
Belgium 2.1 3.0 0.5 11.9
Canada , 5.9 8.8 1.8 14.1
Denmark 3.6 6.5 1.1 6.4
Finland 2.7 . 4.5 0.7 8.2
France 2.4 3.2 0.5 8.5
Germany 3.5 5.2 1.4 8.5
Iceland 5.6 11.3 3.9 13.2
Ireland 5.6 9.1 1.3 11.2
Italy 3.7 5.9 1.6 18.2
Japan 0.9 1.8 0.3 10.0
N. Zealand 9.1 14.0 2.3 14.2
Netherlands 2.6 4.6' 1.0 10.4
Norway 5.2 8.7 0.9 7.1
Spain 2.2 4.6 0.7 13.0
Sweden 1.8 4.0 0.6 8.2
Switzerland 4.4 7.1 1.1 9.1
UK 2.5 5.4 1.3 10.9
US 7.1 10.5 2.2 10.3
Average 3.9 6.7 1.3 10.9
Notes: Start-up rate is the % of adult population in the process of starting a
business. TEA is the % of the adult population starting up or owner of a young
business (GEM 2002). Business ownership is the % of the labour
force who owns a business (EIM).
Table 2: Entrepreneurship measures
Although, as can be seen in Table 2, start-up rates vary widely across countries, 
the country ranking has remained relatively stable since the first GEM report in 
1999. This stability suggests, along the lines of Scarpetta el at. [2002], that, 
irrespective of the moment of the cycle or international economic framework, 
entrepreneurial activity responds to the institutional framework of the country 
in which the entrepreneurs operate.
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1.4 The contribution o f this thesis: entrepreneurial activ ity  
and em ploym ent
We have tried to convince the reader about the importance of the entrepreneurship 
phenomenon in explaining the aggregate employment performance of the country. 
Policy-makers can affect employment, and unemployment, by issuing policies able 
to foster entrepreneurship. That conclusion rises new questions and broadens the 
debate on the causes of unemployment. This thesis aims to contribute to that 
incipient discussion. It does so by examining, from an empirical and theoretical 
point of view, different aspects of the firm creation process, and their impact on 
aggregate employment performance. The recurring question to be answered in each 
of the three papers that constitute this thesis is: “what is the impact on aggregate 
employment?.”
At the 18th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, celebrated 
on August 2003 in Stockholm, Richard Rogerson presented a paper entitled “The 
European Employment and Unemployment Experience.” He explained that there 
are two ways within the literature to explain the observed differences between 
the European and the US unemployment development. The old view studies 
the factors behind the behaviour of unemployment. Such factors included labour 
market institutions and, possibly, macroeconomic shocks. The new view studies 
the factors behind the evolution of employment.
Contrary to what it might look, both views attempt to explain different phenomena. 
If, as labour economists, we focus on unemployment, we should try to explain the 
employment loss in the industrial sector. If we focus instead on employment we 
should try to answer the question why Europe has not developed a market service 
sector able to create as much employment as the US one.
The special characteristics of the service sector, dominated by small entrepreneurial 
firms, imply that not only labour market regulations -the usual suspects- but also
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barriers to entrepreneurship, such as the administrative burdens on firm creation, 
might play an important role.
There is very little research exploring the impact of barriers to entrepreneurship 
on the labour market. Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides [2000] and Pissarides 
[2003] explore the impact of the administrative burdens on firm creation on the 
labour market equilibrium in a matching framework. Also, Ebell and Haefke
[2003] study in a theoretical model the impact of product market regulations 
on unemployment although the calibrated contribution of those regulations to 
unemployment is quite small.
The aim of the second chapter of this thesis is to complement the scarce 
theoretical literature on the issue by testing empirically the impact of administrative 
burdens on firm creation on service employment and unemployment. The idea 
behind the analysis is to answer the question posed by Richard Rogerson at the 
Stockholm conference: why has Europe not developed a market service sector able 
to create as much employment as the US one? And we might add, what has been 
the cost in terms of unemployment?
We argue that the differential productivity growth in the manufacturing and 
service sector has resulted in a shift of employment towards the service sector in all 
developed economies. That new supply of labour in the service sector has not been 
successfully absorbed in some countries, with the result of higher unemployment. 
In which countries? In those countries where institutions are not friendly to new 
firm creation. One of those institutions are the administrative burdens on firm 
creation, or start-up costs.
The chapter is a contribution to the empirical literature explaining the rise 
of unemployment since the 1970s in western economies by means of interactions 
between shocks and institutions. Using a panel of 20 OECD countries over 27 
years, the chapter aims to add to the traditional explanations of unemployment
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the interaction of a shock able to size the employment shift towards the service 
sector with the administrative burdens on firm creation.
The results appear to support the working hypotheses of the chapter: countries 
with higher start-up costs have significantly lower service employment, and higher 
unemployment. When the contribution of each institution to the predicted increase 
in unemployment is estimated, unemployment benefits and start-up costs emerge as 
the two largest contributors. On the other hand, employment protection legislation, 
a usual suspect, appears to have contributed in less than 1 percentage point in 
average to the overall increase. Hence, policies aimed at decreasing the administrative 
burdens on firm creation might have a sizeable impact on unemployment.
The administrative burdens on firm creation are one of many arguments entering 
into the individual decision to become an entrepreneur. We have argued above that 
the process of firm creation depends ultimately upon the individual balance of risks 
and rewards associated to entrepreneurship, and its comparison with the possible 
alternatives. Only when the expected income from entrepreneurship exceeds the 
expected income from the alternatives will an individual decide to start a new’ 
business. Within the economic literature, the prevalent economic framework to 
study this issue has been the general model of occupational choice. That model 
dates back at least to Knight [1921] but was more recently updated by Lucas [1978] 
and Jovanovic [1994], who used it to explain why firms of varying size exist, and 
by Kihlstrom and Laffont [1979] who incorporated risk-aversion to show that only 
those individuals more willing to take risks end up being entrepreneurs.
The idea of the third chapter of this thesis is similar to Kihlstrom and Laffont 
[1979], namely, to analyse the impact of risk-aversion upon the equilibrium supply 
of entrepreneurs. In contrast to them, we focus on the impact of risk-aversion on 
the labour market, which they assume to be competitive.
The labour market literature has been dominated so far by the assumption of
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risk-neutral firms. But job creation is shifting away from large firms, where that 
assumption could be justified, to small entrepreneurial firms. The main function of 
the entrepreneur, according to Knight [1921] in his “Risk, Uncertainty and Profit”, 
is to take decisions and bear “true” uncertainty, that is, not insurable uncertainty.
It is that role of the entrepreneur, along with the increasing importance of new 
firms as source of jobs, what justifies the analysis in the third chapter of the impact 
of risk-aversion on job creation and aggregate unemployment.
In the model of chapter 3, vacancies co-exist with unemployed in a matching 
framework where wages are posted optimally by risk-averse firms. Firms have 
to decide whether to start operating -which is risky- or to invest their assets 
in something riskless. Risk-aversion increases equilibrium unemployment for two 
reinforcing reasons. First, the risk-premium associated to the gamble of starting 
a new business increases. Second, risk-averse firms post higher wages to reduce 
the risk of not finding the appropriate worker for the post, which decreases further 
the expected utility from entrepreneurship. Calibrations show that some kind of 
risk-sharing between potential entrepreneurs and public institutions could have an 
important effect on the labour market, decreasing both the equilibrium level of 
wages and unemployment.
An alternative strategy to affect the risk-reward balance associated to entrepreneurship, 
other than a risk-sharing scheme, is to decrease the cost of entrepreneurial failure. 
European respondents to the Eurobarometer identified the risk of going bankrupt 
as one of the most feared risks associated to entrepreneurship.3 Hence, one possibility 
is to soften the bankruptcy law. The idea is that long discharge periods after 
bankruptcy, or some other punishment to failed entrepreneurs, prevent capable 
and willing individuals to exploit a business opportunity. The fourth chapter of
3Flash Eurobarometer 134 “Entrepreneurship”. Realised by EOS Gallup Europe upon request 
of the European Comission (Directorate General ’’Enterprise”), 2000, 2001 and 2002.
24
the thesis uses a general equilibrium framework to analyse the impact that such a 
change in the bankruptcy law has on the equilibrium supply of entrepreneurs and 
on aggregate employment.
To start a new venture the potential entrepreneur needs some seed capital, 
which can only be provided by banks. Banks have imperfect information about the 
true probability of success of start-ups and therefore set the interest rates according 
to the expected probability of success of the entrepreneur. When the government 
softens the bankruptcy law, failure becomes less costly. Individuals who, given 
their entrepreneurial ability did not consider entrepreneurship an option before, 
might try to start their own company. Banks observe a decrease in the expected 
probability of success of entrepreneurs and rise their interest rates.
That negative impact of the bankruptcy law reform on the cost of finance 
affects not only the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs, but also the employment 
creation of each of them. Assuming that firm size in terms of employment depends 
on the capital cost, and therefore on the interest rate, we find that aggregate 
employment and bankruptcy cost are related “& la Laffer.” Initial reductions of th e ' 
cost of failure encourages entrepreneurship and increases aggregate employment. 
However, further reductions have a negative effect on employment because, even 
with more entrepreneurs in equilibrium, each of them is creating little employment.
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2 Labour market performance and start-up costs: 
OECD evidence
Labour economists in search for policies to decrease unemployment have traditionally 
focused on institutions that affect the expansion of firms. But another important 
source of jobs, specially in service-dominated economies, is the creation of new 
firms. That notion has been ignored so far in the unemployment literature. In 
this chapter we start filling that gap. We do so by including, along the traditional 
explanations of unemployment, an institution able to affect firm creation, namely, 
the administrative burdens of firm creation.
Robert Solow once said that one of the few good ways to test analytical ideas 
is to see whether they can make sense of international differences in institutional 
structure and historical development. This chapter follows that advise, as do most 
of the large literature aimed at explaining the unusual and persistent increase in 
the unemployment rate .
In the 1970s the discussion was dominated by a shock story. Supply shocks of 
the 1970s and 1980s and the contractional macroeconomic policies to fight inflation 
were blamed for unemployment. But shocks across countries are not likely to vary 
enough to explain the observed differences in labour market performance. And 
the effect of shocks on unemployment is, in any case, temporary. Then, how 
can one explain the persistence on the one hand and the different unemployment 
experiences across countries on the other?
The focus moved to labour market institutions, ignoring shocks all together 
sometimes. But the “usual suspects”, the unemployment insurance system, the 
employment protection legislation or the union power, were already in place when 
European unemployment was below the North-American one. There are three 
possible answers to that. First, labour market rigidities have become worse over
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time. It is true that some institutions, as the benefit insurance system or the 
tax wedge, have grown consistently in most OECD countries.4 But others such 
as employment protection legislation or union density have decreased in the last 
decade (after an initial period of increase). The second way out could be that 
labour market rigidities impact on labour performance with a lag. The rise of 
unemployment in the early 70s could be then the result of rigidities introduced in 
the market ten years before.
The third answer, however, is lately the most popular: labour market rigidities 
were not so important in the past because there were no adverse shocks. Differences 
in labour market outcomes must be due to differences in the way that countries 
respond to similar shocks, which depends ultimately on the country specific institutions. 
It is the interaction of shocks with institutions what can explain the persistence of 
the shocks and the different labour market performance evolution across economies, 
after being hit by similar shocks. The first economists in picking this idea up were 
Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sacks in their 1985 book The Economics of Worldwide 
Stagflation where they focused on the interaction of the 1970s oil price shocks w ith ' 
the nature of collective bargaining.
This paper is intended to make a contribution to this line of research. The 
contribution is twofold. First, the impact of a general feature of developed economies 
that has been surprisingly neglected in the literature is analyzed, namely, the 
employment shift from industry and agriculture to services. The second contribution 
of the paper is the focus on the interaction of that shock with one important barrier 
to entrepreneurship, the administrative burdens on firm creation, start-up costs 
from now on.
The idea is that the shift of employment towards the service sector has generated
4By “increase” or “growth” of institutions it is meant a change that makes labour markets 
more “rigid” as could be an extension of the time unemployed receive benefits or an increase in 
the tax wedge. The opposite holds with “decrease”.
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a large increase in the service labour supply in all developed economies. That new 
supply of labour has not been successfully absorbed in countries where the high 
administrative burdens on new firm creation impeded potential entrepreneurs to 
undertake the new business opportunities. The result has been higher unemployment
The employment shift towards the service sector is a very well documented fact. 
Viktor Fuchs published in 1968 his path-breaking study The Service Economy. 
Around that time, Baumol published in the American Economic Review his paper 
“Unbalanced Growth,” where the possible causes of the wide-spread shift of labour 
from industry and agriculture to the service sector were laid out.5
Baumol sorted economic activities into two groups: technologically progressive 
activities in which innovations, capital accumulation and economies of scale lead 
to increases in labour productivity (production sector); and constant productivity 
activities where labour is not a mean but the end so innovation can hardly increase 
productivity (service sector). The increase in labour productivity in the former 
sector brings about an increase in wages that is then spread to the overall economy. 
The constant productivity sector cannot compensate the rise in wages so production 
costs and prices increase. There are several effects at stake. First, the labour 
productivity growth is generating wealth that will be spent in services and non­
services. Second, the relative increase in the service prices is inducing people to 
substitute away from services. As long as the substitution effect is not “too large” 
(the service demand is price-inelastic), the overall demand for services will not 
decrease. To keep production in a sector with constant or decreasing productivity, 
labour has to be shifted from the high productivity sector.
Figure 1 shows the unweighted OECD average of manufacturing to service 
labour productivity and manufacturing to service price deflator. The pattern
5See also Baumol et al. [1985] where a third sector of “asymptocally stagnation”, with a 
mix of progressive and stagnant inputs, was introduced. In Kongsamut et al. [2001] Baumol’s 
imbalanced growth and Kaldor’s balanced growth are reconcile.
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shown, which reproduces nicely Baumol predictions, is a feature of every country 
in the sample.
o  Maf. to Sv. LProd. trend a  Mf. to Sv. price index
1.4 7 -
0.91 -
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
period beginning...
Figure 1: Manufacturing to service labour productivity and price index
Following Baumol we claim that the employment shift into services was the 
outcome of an exogenous shock: the slower productivity growth in services relative 
to non-service sectors. This approach is consistent with the arguments linking total 
factor productivity growth slowdown with unemployment but it emphasizes the 
differential productivity growth in services and the rest of the economy.6 Rather 
than on the overall fall in the supply or demand of jobs, the focus is on the shift 
of jobs and workers from non-service to service activities.
Figure 2 shows the annualized growth from 1970 to 1997 of total employment 
compared to the annualized growth of working age population (WAP) in seven 
OECD countries and the EU average.
Only Japan, the UK and USA were able to create enough jobs to compensate for
6See Phelps [1994] and more recently Blanchard and Wolfers [2000]. The argument is that 
the slowdown in total productivity growth has not been matched with a slowdown of wages and 
therefore unemployment has increased.
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Figure 2: Employment and working age population annualised growth in %:
1970-97
the increase in working age population. Spain had an unfortunate combination of 
very poor employment growth and rather high increase in working age population. 
The question is, what is behind those differences in employment growth? Figure 
3 shows the annualized contribution of each economic sector to total employment 
growth. The sector contributions are calculated as the annualized sector employment 
growth weighted by the sector’s initial share of total employment.
Service employment growth accounts for most of the employment growth. The 
poor employment performance of Spain is the result of a very large release of 
workers from the agriculture, and to a lesser extent from the industry sector, along 
with a below average service job creation. The impressive performance of the USA 
is due to an incredible ability to create jobs in the service sector and of a very 
limited loss of employment in the non-service sectors.
The inability of the major European economies to create enough jobs to absorb 
the increasing supply of labour has been well documented. Krueger and Pischke 
[1997], for example, decompose the growth of employment between population
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Figure 3: Annualised sector contribution to employment growth in %: 1970-97
growth and other reasons and show that population growth in Europe does not 
create jobs at the same rate as it does in USA. They go further in the paper and 
claim that the reason for this is not, as usually believed, Europe’s wage rigidity. 
That explanation would imply that unemployment would have to increase most in 
Europe among groups whose wages have fallen most in USA. But that is not the 
case: the unemployment rate of the low-skilled group of workers (relative to the 
high-skilled one) is roughly the same in Europe and the United States. Krueger 
and Pischke rather suggest that the problem is the existence of restrictions on 
bringing new products to the market or on starting new businesses. When these 
restrictions are in place, the increase in labour supply is not translated into an 
equivalent increase in the number of employers, and unemployment results.
This brings us to the second contribution of this chapter, which is to relate 
the inability to create “enough” service jobs in some countries to their institutions 
governing firm creation and other product market regulations.
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The 1994 McKinsey Global Institute report “Employment Performance” was 
perhaps the first study which claimed that product market regulations, as opposed 
to labour market regulations, were very important in explaining poor job creation 
in the service sector in Europe. Also in 1994, the OECD Jobs Study affirmed 
that “new jobs are likely to appear in the service sector, which already accounts 
for more than half of total employment in most OECD countries (...). New jobs 
must certainly be generated by the private sector, because in nearly all countries 
budget deficits and resistance to tax increases rule out significant expansion of 
the public sector (...). Efforts to improve the capacity of economies to create jobs 
should focus on facilitating the development and use of technology; working time 
flexibility; encouragement of entrepreneurship and a general review of policies that 
may be hampering job creation”7
The OECD went further in this direction publishing in 1998 a monograph titled 
“Fostering Entrepreneurship.” They also have very recently published comparable 
data on product market regulations (details are given in the next section) and 
consistent data on firm dynamics for 10 OECD countries. The paper by Scarpetta 
et al. [2002] is a recent application of both data-sets. In that paper the authors 
test the role that policy and institutional settings in product and labour markets 
play for productivity and firm dynamics. They find that industry productivity 
performance is negatively affected by strict product market regulations. The 
second important finding is that more cumbersome regulation on entrepreneurial 
activity and costs of adjusting the workforce seem to negatively affect the entry of 
new small firms and their posterior expansion.
We claim that countries which suffered the biggest rise in unemployment are 
the ones that failed to provide policies and institutions that were conductive to 
the employment in services. A key policy in this respect is the regulation of
7 The italics are mine. See OECD Jobs Study [1994].
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business openings. Service employment occurs on average in smaller and more 
decentralized establishments than manufacturing and successful new job creation 
in services requires the setting up of new companies.8 Countries where starting 
a business is cumbersome have failed to accommodate the employment shift from 
manufacturing and agriculture into services, at the cost of higher unemployment.
The paper follows very closely the methodology used by Blanchard and Wolfers 
in their highly acknowledge paper of 2000 (that paper will be referred as B&W 
from now on). In that paper the authors use a panel of 20 countries to explain 
the evolution of unemployment in the OECD from the 1960s via the interaction 
of shocks and institutions. The shocks included are the decrease in annual TFP 
growth, the increase in long-term interest rate, and the shift in labour demand. 
The institutions include the unemployment insurance system, the cost of hiring 
and firing, wage bargaining characteristics and active labour market policies.
Taking as a starting point the B&W model, we substitute the aggregate TFP 
growth by the differential productivity growth in manufacturing and services, and 
pdd one institution, namely, start-up costs. The purpose is to test whether start-up 
costs, when interacted with the shift of employment from non-services to services, 
can explain the poor service employment performance and high unemployment 
rate of some countries.
The next section describes with some detail the data used in the estimations. 
Section two of the chapter explains the methodology and empirical results. Section 
three concludes.
8In 1995 the European Observatory of SMEs reported that the average service firm size in 
the European Union was of 5 employees, as compared to 16 employees in industry and energy. 
The data for United States, from the SB A, is in 1997 of 21 and 56 employees respectively. As 
Scarpetta et al. [2002] confirm in their paper, American entrant firms are smaller than European 
ones but then expand much more.
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2.1 D ata descript ion
A panel data-set building on the one constructed and analyzed by B&W has 
been put together.9 We drew data from. B&W for unemployment, labour market 
institutions and shocks. Product Market Indicators from the OECD were added. 
The three macroeconomic shocks of B&W were complemented with a fourth shock 
intended to capture the sectorial shift from non-service to service activities over 
the last decades. An unbalanced data-set is available for 20 OECD countries 
along 27 years, from 1970 to 1997.10 The countries included in the analysis 
are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
There are three dependent variables: the unemployment rate on the one hand, 
and the service and manufacturing employment ratios on the other. All data 
come from the OECD Annual Labour Force Survey. Unemployment numbers 
are those gathered in the National Labour Force surveys. Service employment 
comprises civilian employment employed in sectors such as wholesale and retail 
trade; restaurants and hotels; transport, storage and communications; financing, 
insurance, real state and business services; and community, social and personal 
services. We have also carried out the regressions using industry civilian employment 
instead of manufacturing employment; the results are very robust.
Table 3, shows the change from 1970 to 1997 of unemployment and service
employment in the United States, Japan and five large European countries: France,
9Both the data-set and the original Stata program are available in Olivier Blanchard’s or Justin 
Wolfer’s web-page. Please refer to their work for technical details concerning the construction of 
the variables.
10Blanchard and Wolfers [2000] work with a datarset that covers the period 1960-1997. 
However, the unavailability of data on sector employment, production and price indexes in earlier 
years made it advisable to reduce the observation period to 1970-1997.
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Germany, Italy, Spain and UK.
Countries Change in 
unemployment: 1970-97
Change in service 
employment: 1970-97
France 7.37 8.73
Germany 8.79 8.88
Italy 7.77 8.62
Spain 19.99 6.23
UK 5.35 11.19
USA .09 14.45
Japan 1.94 11.40
Source: OECD Annual Labour Force
Note: Unemployment is expressed in % of labor force.
Service employment is in % of working age population
Table 3: Change in unemployment and service employment
Countries that experienced the most limited increases in service employment 
over the period 1970-97, like Spain or Italy, are also the ones that suffered the 
largest increases in unemployment in the same period. Indeed, the correlation ’ 
between both growth rates (using all countries in the panel) is of (-0.7). That 
correlation encourages further research to understand why service employment 
did not increase as much in some countries and to what extent that explains the 
different unemployment experiences across countries.
2.1.1 Institu tions 
Labour M arket institu tions
Tim e-constant institu tions
Data for labour market institutions come originally from Nickell [1997]. Nickell 
presents averages of eight labour market institutions for 1983-1988 and for 1989- 
1994. B&W use the average of both periods as the time-constant value of each
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labour market institution. They argue that institutions change only very slowly 
so the average value of the institution over the period gives a sense of the ability 
of the countries to deal with the shocks. We discuss briefly the definitions.
• Employment Protection Legislation (EPL): The source of the index is the 
OECD Jobs Studies published in 1994. The OECD ranked countries according 
to the legal framework governing firing and hiring. The index is the ranking 
of 20 countries, 20 indicating the most strictly regulated country. The 
OECD measure comprises characteristics both of the individual and collective 
contract termination. That includes features as notice time and financial 
compensation, rights to appeal against termination or administrative procedures.
• Benefit Replacement Rate: Gross benefits for a single person under 50, 
expressed as percentage of the most relevant wage (normally gross wage).
• Benefit Duration: It captures how long the unemployed are entitled to receive 
unemployment insurance. It is expressed in years. Four or more years are 
considered infinite duration.
• Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP): It refers to expenditures on activities 
for the unemployed that are aimed at helping them back into work. The 
numbers are expenditure per unemployed person taken as percentage of GDP 
per member of the labour force.
• Union Density: It shows the proportion of trade union members as percentage 
of total wage and salary earners. This variable alone does not give a good 
idea of the union influence in a country, though, since in many countries 
wage negotiations affect workers who are not union members. That is why 
we need to include as well the next variable.
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• Union Coverage: This variable shows the share of workers actually affected 
by union bargaining. It takes three values. 1 means that only under 25% 
of workers is covered. 2 means that the percentage of covered employees is 
between 25 and 70%. Lastly, 3 means that more than 70% of workers are 
effected by union negotiation on wages.
• Wage Bargaining Coordination: In each country the degree of employer and 
worker wage bargaining coordination is ranked from a low coordination index 
of 1 to a high coordination value of 3.
• Tax burden on labour: This is a crude measure of the tax wedge between 
real labour costs and take home pay. It is the sum of the average payroll, 
consumption and income tax rates.
Table 4 shows the average values over the period 1983-1994 of all eight labour 
market institutions for the 20 OECD countries included in the study.
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B.R Benefit Union Union Co­ Tax
Countries' , EPL Rate Duration ALMP Density Coverage ordination Wedge
Australia 4 37.5 4 3.0 42.55 3 3 29.8
Austria 10 55 3 13.4 48.70 3 6 54.1
Belgium 17 60 4 9.5 52.4 3 4 48.7
Canada 3 59.5 •8 7.7 35.9 2 2 40.3
Denmark 5 90 2.5 12.9 72.6 3 6 47.6
Finland 10 69 3 12.3 71-5 3 5.5 62.8
France 14 ' 57 3.4 9.24 11.8 3 4 63.3
Germany 15 63 4 16.2 33.6 3 5 52.8
Ireland 12 43.5 4. 11.6 51.6 3 2 34
Italy 20 11 .5 9.5 41.5 3 3.5 60.1
Japan 8 60 .5 6.6 26.9 2 4 34.7
Nether. 9 70 3 , 4.3 28 3 4 57.9
Norway 11 65 1.5 12.3 56.3 3 6 49.3
NZ 2 34 4 9.7 47.6 2 3 35.1
Portugal • 18 62.5 .7 9.28 39.1 3 4 35.6
Spain 19 75 3.5 7.5 14.5 3 3 52.2
Sweden 13 80 1.2 59.3 81.8 3 6 69.8
Switzerland 6 70 1 14.8 27.6 2 4 39.3
UK 7 37 4 8.8 42 2.5 2 42.7
USA 1 50 .5 2.6 17.3 1 2 43.2
Source: Nickell [1997]
Table 4: Labor market institutions, average 1983-94
The first column presents the OECD employment protection legislation index 
(EPL). The countries of southern Europe have the stricter regulation and Switzerland, 
Denmark and the United Kingdom have regulation comparable to the one in place 
in USA.
The benefit system shows great variation across countries. On the top one finds 
the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland and Sweden (not so much Norway) with 
over 70% of the gross wage in the first year of unemployment. However, these 
countries have strictly time-limited systems. Italy barely had an unemployment
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benefit system at all for most of the postwar period. The next column shows the 
active labour market policies such as training or assistance with job search. The 
clear outlier is Sweden with an impressive expenditure per unemployed of 60% of 
GDP per potential worker. Far away follow the rest of the countries with numbers 
around 10%. USA and Australia are at the tail in this particular ranking. In these 
two countries the activities to become more employable are left to the individuals, 
with no government intervention.
The next three columns intend to describe the wage setting system of the 
countries. It is remarkable that countries with the lowest union membership, as 
it is the case of France and Spain, present the largest union coverage, or in other 
words, percentage of workers affected by union agreements. In countries of central 
and north Europe, wage bargaining is most coordinated. Overall tax wedge does 
not present large differences across countries, although that would not be the case 
if we were to look at each of its components.
The first inspection of the data seems to indicate the existence of large institutional 
differences across countries.
Although the quality of time-varying data on labour market institutions is still 
far from optimal, we will also carry out the analysis with time-variant data. Thus 
a brief analysis of the time evolution of the institutions for which data is available 
is presented below.
Tim e-varying institutions
B&W offer in their article time-varying series of employment protection legislation 
and benefit replacement rates. The employment protection legislation index resulted 
from chaining Lazear [1990] data (from 1960-85) to OECD data (1985-95). The 
OECD data is constructed on the basis of a more extensive collection of employment 
protection dimensions, compared to the data used by Lazear. The data on benefit
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replacement rates refer to the first year of unemployment benefit, averaged over 
family types of recipients. The benefits are expressed as a percentage of average 
earnings before tax.
Nickell and Nunziata [2002] have completed the data-set adding four more 
time-varying labour market institutions: benefit duration, union density, wage 
bargaining coordination and tax wedge. The definitions are the same as before 
although the sources and construction change in some cases. One of those cases is 
the benefit duration index. Nickell and Nunziata [2002] have constructed a more 
elaborated index than that provided by the number of years of benefit entitlement, 
trying to capture both the change in replacement rate over the years and the 
number of years one can receive unemployment insurance. They take the weighted 
average of the second and third year of benefit replacement rate and the fourth 
and fifth year, both normalized by the first year replacement rate. More weight 
is given to the replacement rate received at the beginning of the unemployment 
period. The index takes a maximum value of 1 if replacement rate is constant 
indefinitely (over four years) and a minimum value of 0 when benefits stop after 
the first year.
The common wisdom is that, after being introduced in the early 60s when equity 
considerations gained prominence in the public debate, labour market institutions 
have not varied substantially within countries. The next paragraphs will be dedicated 
to assess whether the data shows fundamental movements over time of the institutions.
Figure 4 shows the time-evolution of six labour market institutions over the 
period 1970-1995. The solid line is the unweighted average of all OECD countries. 
We have checked the significance of the time trend at the individual level as well 
as at the OECD level as a whole.
Starting by the benefit duration, the time trend is positive in all countries 
with the exception of Belgium, where it dropped at the beginning of the period
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Figure 4: Time evolution of labour market institutions, 1970-1995. Average
OECD countries
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and then remained stable thereafter. Ireland presents an almost perfect U-shaped 
curve, with strong decreases at the beginning of the period and increases at the end. 
Netherlands and Finland have reduced in the last years their benefit duration. The 
benefit replacement rate has also increased over time in most OECD countries. The 
exceptions are Germany and UK, where replacement rates have steadily declined, 
and in smaller scale, Belgium and Japan. The overall time-trend in both cases, 
benefit duration and replacement rate, is positive and significant.
Employment protection regulation shows an inverted U-shape, with increases 
in regulation at the beginning of the period and a tendency towards deregulation 
at the end. This averaged effect over all countries hides, however, significant 
positive increases in protection legislation in Austria, France, which presents a
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steady increase over the period, and Portugal with large increases at the beginning 
of the period and stable values thereafter. Spain and Italy started with very 
regulated firing and hiring rules and then moved towards deregulation. The 1970s 
strikes in Italy tightened employment protection regulation until it was virtually 
impossible to fire a worker. As unemployment stayed high, temporary contracts 
were introduced in 1977, layoffs for economic reasons were authorized in mid-8Qs 
and fired restrictions were eased for large firms in the 90s.11 In Spain, during 
the Franco period workers were granted greater job security in exchange for the 
removal of collective rights. During the transition to democracy, emphasis was put 
on the change in collective labour law while there was continuity in all regulations 
concerning individual employment relationships. The sustained increase in unemployment 
rate justified the introduction of fixed-term contracts with lower severance payments 
in 1984 and then again in mid-1990s.12 Sweden, and to a lesser extent Germany, 
increased employment protection at the beginning of the period to decrease it 
at the end. The overall trend, with the exceptions mentioned above, is towards 
deregulation.
The only institution whose value has increased over time for all countries 
appears to be the tax wedge. This can be explained by the need to finance 
increasingly generous social insurance benefits in all OECD countries. The individual 
regressions confirm this general upward trend with the only exception of the 
Netherlands. The Netherlands and the UK are indeed the two countries who have 
significantly overhauled labour market institutions. Since mid-80s, Netherlands 
implemented wage restraints which decreased real labour cost per unit of output
which is what shows up in the individual regression. The time trend for the UK is
11 See Siebert [1997] for a nice review of the time-evolution of labour market institutions in 
Europe.
12See Milner et al. [1995] for a discussion on employment protection legislation and labour 
market outcomes in Spain.
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only significant at the 10% of significance level since there was a sharp increase in 
the tax wedge previous to the, also sharp, decrease of the Thatcher era.
Wage bargaining coordination has not changed substantially in most countries 
over the last three decades. Some exceptions are the increase in bargaining coordination 
in France, Portugal and Italy, and the decrease in Denmark, Sweden, UK and New 
Zealand. Overall, the time trend is non-significant.
Union density shows a similar shape to that of EPL. The Nordic countries, 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are the exception with strong increases in 
union density over the period. The only other country with a strong unionization 
movement is Spain, which again is related to the recovery of collective rights during 
the democratic transition, although the level is much lower than that in the Nordic 
countries. Overall, however, union density has a negative non-significant trend over 
the period.
To summarize, tax wedge, benefit replacement rates and duration exhibited 
a wide-spread increase over the period of analysis in almost all OECD countries. 
Employment protection legislation and union density showed in average an inverted 
U-shape with a late tendency towards deregulation. There are, however some 
exceptions as the increase in protection of France and the increase in unionization 
of the Nordic countries. Employers and workers coordination in wage bargaining 
has remained fundamentally stable.
We have added to the labour market institutions presented above a proxy for 
the minimum wage level in the country. The idea is that the same argument 
that applies to start-up costs governs wage floors. That is, the failure to create 
enough jobs in the service sector could be due to the existence of wage floors, which 
prevented small firms from hiring more people. The proxy is the ratio of the first 
percentile of earnings distribution to the fifth percentile or median. The earnings 
dispersion data come from the OECD Employment Outlooks of 1993 and 1996.
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There is no data for Spain and Ireland, and data for the rest of the countries is 
very incomplete. Therefore, any comment has to be done with caution.
Start-up costs
The OECD has recently published an indicator of product market regulations 
for 21 OECD countries (excluding the new central and eastern European members, 
Korea, Mexico and Turkey); unfortunately, only for one year: 1998.13 The data 
come from responses of OECD countries to an ad hoc questionnaire and other 
sources. The information was grouped in the following regulatory domains:
• State control over business enterprises: Overall size of the public enterprise 
sector; existence and extent of special rights over business enterprises; legislative 
control over public enterprises; existence of price controls; and use of command 
and control regulations.
• Barriers to entrepreneurship: Features of the licensing and permit system; 
communication and simplification of rules and procedures; administrative 
burdens of corporate and sole-proprietors start-ups; industry specific administrative 
burdens; scope of legal barriers to entry and existence of antitrust exemptions
for public enterprises.
• Barriers to international trade and investment: Barriers to share-ownership 
for non-resident operators; discriminatory procedures in international trade 
and competition policies; regulatory barriers to trade; and average tariffs.
To calculate the overall product market regulation index, each coded indicator 
was re-scaled to be between 0 and 6. Then the indicators were aggregated into the 
summary indicators and finally into the overall indicator weighting each component
13For a full description of the data-set see Nicoletti et al. [2000].
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according to its contribution to the overall variance in the data (factor analysis 
methodology).
The “barriers to entrepreneurship” indicator has three sub-domains: Regulatory 
and administrative opacity, barriers to competition, and administrative burdens 
on start-ups. The variable “administrative burdens on start-ups” is defined as 
“administrative burdens for corporations, for sole-proprietorship and sector specific 
burdens,” such as those present in the retail sector. The latter is a variable of 
interest regarding the current analysis because it includes administrative burdens, 
not only of corporations but also of sole-account proprietors, which is the legal 
form that most start-ups assume. This is an advantage over other possible data 
sources such as the one offered by Djankov et al. [2000]. In that paper the authors 
gather data on required procedures governing entry regulation as well as the cost 
in time and monetary terms of following those procedures. However, data refer 
only to limited liability companies, which is a handicap if one wants to study the 
impact of those procedures on firm creation.
0 Hence, the OECD sub-domain “administrative burdens on start-ups” will be 
used in the analysis to proxy institutions governing firm creation. Recall that 
it is our claim that countries with large administrative burdens on firm creation 
were not able to create enough service jobs to absorb displaced workers from other 
economic sectors. However, and for the sake of comparison, the analysis will also 
be done using the overall index of product market regulation.
Figure 5 shows start-up costs in 1998 across OECD countries. Leading the 
classification is Italy, followed by France and Spain. The countries where opening 
a new business is easiest are UK, USA and Denmark.
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Figure 5: Administrative burdens on start-up costs, 1998
2.1.2 Macroeconomic Shocks
B&W identify three negative macroeconomic shocks that might have contributed 
to the increase in unemployment over the last decades: the decline in total factor 
productivity growth, the shift in labour demand, or equivalently, the increase in 
the capital share and, finally, the increase in long-term interest rate.
The Total Factor Productivity growth is calculated as the growth of the Solow 
residual for the business sector scaled by the labour share. From the early 70s, 
the TFP growth, specially in Europe, has slowed down. If workers and firms 
are slow to adapt to the slower growth of productivity, profits will decrease, and 
so will capital accumulation and employment. Capital shares started increasing 
in the 1980s in most European countries. There are two possible reasons. The 
first possibility ventured by Blanchard [1999] is a technological change biased to 
capital. The second one is a decrease in firms’ labour hoarding (when firms employ 
too much labour at a given wage), maybe fostered by the historical lose of power 
of unions within Europe. Both possibilities lead to a decrease in labour demand 
and, therefore, to an increase in unemployment. Finally, the real interest rate,
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calculated as the long-term nominal rate on government bonds minus a five-year 
average of lagged inflation, has increased steadily since the beginning of the 80s.
Baumol [1967] claimed that the employment shift from non-service to services 
observed in the last decades was the result of the differential productivity growth in 
the different economic sectors. To be accurate, one should focus on the differential 
total factor productivity growth in manufacturing and services, rather than on 
the differential labour productivity growth. It is only total factor productivity 
changes that one can assume exogenous since labour productivity depends, among 
other things, on capital accumulation which is an endogenous variable.14 Using 
the OECD International Sector Database to construct sector TFP rates we have 
been able to put together an unbalanced panel of 13 countries, out of the 20 
countries under analysis.15 That comes to around 50 observations when we run 
the regressions with five-year averages. Taking into account that there are at least 
24 explanatory variables in the regression, that panel is clearly not sufficient to 
yield something meaningful about the impact of shocks and institutions.
# Since capital stock changes only slowly, labour productivity is much more' 
cyclical than total factor productivity. Hence one possible way of proceeding 
is to use a smoothed version of labour productivity as a proxy to total factor 
productivity.16 Figure 6 shows the ratio of manufacturing to service smoothed 
labour productivity and manufacturing to service total factor productivity evolution 
over time. The former is the average of 18 countries and the later is the average 
of 13 countries.
In spite of the different number of countries included, the evolution along time
14We thank Marc Mtlndler for intensive discussions about this point.
15We followed the methodology of Bernard and Jones [1996a] and [1996b] to construct sector 
TFP rates. They first calculate a base year manufacturing and service TFP, and then estimate 
the rest of the years using a Divisia-Tornquist multifactor productivity rate.
16The variable was smoothed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. We used a lambda equal to  100 
because the data have annual frequence. We also tried with other values such as 10 or 400, also 
used in the literature, and results did not differ.
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Figure 6 : Manufacturing to service labour and total factor productivity
of both variables is similar; hence the regression with the labour productivity 
trend instead of the total factor productivity will point approximately in the right 
direction. However, we are aware of potential identification problems. To construct 
a better panel data-set of sector total factor productivity will be the next step in 
our research.
2.2 Results
The model to be estimated was first suggested by Blanchard [1999] in a Baffi 
Lecture in Rome titled “European Unemployment: the Role of Shocks and Institutions.” 
In the lecture he defended the interaction between macroeconomic shocks with 
various labour market institutions as the best way to explain, first the persistence 
of the impact of shocks on unemployment, and second, the diverse impact of similar 
shocks in the OECD countries.
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2.2.1 Common unidentified shocks: a benchmark
Tim e-constant institutions
To capture those interactions, the simplest model is as follows:
uit = aid  +  dt +  7j (dt * X{) +  en (1)
i j
where uit is the dependent variable (unemployment, service or manufacturing 
employment rates) in country i at time £, c* are 20 country dummies, dt are time 
dummies, that is, common unidentified shocks17, and X j  is the time-constant value 
over the period of the institution j  in country i. What matters in the estimation 
is not the value of the shock or the institution but the interaction between both of 
them. This is the most general specification since no specific shocks are imposed; 
it allows to isolate the impact of the institutions from that of the shocks on the 
dependent variables. Hence it will be used as a benchmark.
Notice that each institution is allowed to interact separately with the same 
linear combination of shocks. The model is therefore non-linear in parameters.18 
B&W estimate the model using non-linear least squares and do not correct for 
heteroscedasticity present in the regression. Although the coefficients are consistent, 
and therefore it is legitimate to use them to make estimations, they are not efficient, 
that is, with minimum variance, so the standard errors are not correct. In this 
paper the model will be estimated using an equivalent maximum likelihood function 
which allows for White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent variances and standard errors. 
Autocorrelation is only a problem in the regressions with common shocks,
proxied by time dummies. The deviation from the average of the dependent
17The first period is left out so it becomes the constant. Therefore the country dummies can
be interpreted as the unemployment (or sector employment rates) in the first period.
18Rewriting the expression to be estimated:
u it =  H i  <*iCi +  d t +  7i/3i(di * X l )  +  7l/?2(d2 * X } )  +  72^l(dl * X i )  +  12^2^2  * X f )  +  ••• +  cit 
where we have written the example for two time dummies or shocks (di and d<i with coefficients 
and /32) and two institutions (X / and X f  with coefficients 7 X and 72). But we would then 
have to impose non-linear restrictions on the coefficients, so .
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variable, unemployment rate or sector employment rates, is clearly cyclical. In 
the first set of regressions time dummies are used, so there is nothing in the right- 
hand side of expression 1 to account for that cyclical behavior, hence the error 
term is autocorrelated. However, autocorrelation is corrected for when identified 
shocks instead of time dummies are introduced in the regression.
Tables 5, 6 and 7 show respectively the results for the unemployment, service 
and manufacturing regression. Five year averages have been taken (with the 
exception of the last period which only comprises 1995-1997) to smooth out short­
term fluctuations. All institutions are expressed in deviations to the cross-country 
mean. Wage bargaining coordination and active labour market policies have been 
multiplied by (-1) so the expected impact of all institutions on unemployment is 
positive. Country and time dummies were included in all regressions.
Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
1 2 3 4 5
B. Duration .23 (.04) .26 (.05) .29 (.05) .19 (.04) .29 (.06)
B.R.Rate .02 (.00) .02 (.01) .03 (.01) .00 (.00) .02 (.00)
EPL .05 (.02) .01 (.02) -.01 (.02) .02 (.02) .03 (.02)
U.Density .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .02 (.01) .02 (.01) .01 (.01)
Tax Wedge .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .00 (.01) .02 (.01) .02 (.01)
Coordination .26 (.06) .33 (.06) .38 (.05) .12 (.07) .32 (.05)
U. Coverage .07 (.19) .04 (.19) .01 (.19) -.07 (.20) .04 (.21)
ALMP .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .01 (.01)
Start-up costs .38 (.12)
SUC*initial nsv .73 (.16)
Minimum Wage 1.4 (.9)
Product Market Regul. .49 (.17)
Observations 117 117 117 105 117
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 5: Common shokcs: unemployment
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Dependent variable: Service employment ratio
1 2 3 4 5
B. Duration -.10 (.03) -.12 (.03) -.13 (.03) -.10 (.03) -.10 (.03)
B.R.Rate -.00 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00)
EPL -.03 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.03 (.01) -.04 (.01)
U.Density -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00)
Tax Wedge -.01 (.01) -.00 (.01) .00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01)
Coordination -.13 (.04) -.17 (.04) -.17 (.04) -.08 (.06) -.13 (.04)
U.Coverage .19 (.14) .19 (.13) .21 (.13) .15 (.12) .19 (.14)
ALMP -.00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) -.00 (.01)
Start-up costs -.21 (.09)
SUC*initial nsv -.32 (.13)
Minimum Wage .87 (.83)
Product Market Regul. .01 (.12)
Observations 117 117 117 105 117
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 6: Common shocks: service employment
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Dependent variable: Manufacturing employment mtio
* ( 1 2 3 4 5
B. Duration .19 (.06) .24 (.05) .26 (.05) .19 (.06) .24 (.07)
B.R.Rate -.01 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.00)
EPL -.02 (.02) -.08 (.02) -.09 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.03 (.02)
U.Density -.02 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01)
Tax Wedge .01 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01)
Coordination -.17 (.07) -.05 (.06) -.07 (.06) -.04 (.06) -.12 (.07)
U.Coverage .02 (.22) .00 (.18) -.03 (.19) -.10 (.19) .01 (.21)
ALMP -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.03 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01)
Start-up costs .61 (.13)
SUC* initial nsv .86 (.2)
Minimum Wage 2.6 (.85)
Product Market Regul. .41 (.25)
Observations 117 117 117 105 117
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 7: Common shocks: manufacturing
Five different regressions have been run with each dependent variable. The 
first one replicates that of B&W. The results are very similar although not exactly 
the same since the observation period differs. The second regression adds to the 
eight labour market institutions the administrative burdens on start-ups provided 
by the OECD (more concretely, the data is from 1998, which is taken as the time- 
constant value of the institution). The third regression substitutes start-up costs by 
the interaction between start-up costs and the initial non-service employment share 
of the working age population. We daim that the combination of large shifts of 
employment from non-service to service sector with administrative barriers to firm 
creation hampers employment creation, or equivalently, fosters unemployment. 
In the fourth regression start-up costs have been substituted by minimum wages 
(proxied by the first percentile of the earnings distribution to the median wage). 
Regression five includes the overall product market regulation index.
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There is a lot of information in the three tables shown above so let us take you 
slowly through the most interesting results. The first important remark is that 
the unemployment and the service results look like two sides of the same coin. 
When benefit duration, replacement rate, employment protection legislation and 
wage bargaining coordination are positive and significant in the unemployment 
regression, they show as negative and significant in the service regression. This 
result confirms what the first look at the data suggested.
Benefit duration is very robust and significant in all regressions. Countries 
where unemployed receive long benefits experience more unemployment. More 
interesting may be the service and manufacturing regressions. Countries with 
longer benefits than average are countries with less service and more manufacturing 
employment.
The positive sign of benefit duration, the case is the same for the minimum 
wage, in the manufacturing regression is a very robust, and interesting, result. It 
has been reported before that high and long unemployment benefits increase the 
Reservation wage of workers. A high reservation wage means that workers are less 
willing to accept low-paid jobs in the service sector and prefer instead to queue in 
the manufacturing sector. Thus, the shift from non-service to service economy is 
delayed.
Consequently the negative sign of benefit duration in the service regression is 
not surprising. However, there could be something else to the negative impact 
of benefits on service employment. The report of the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor of 2001 found that countries with generous unemployment insurance 
systems were systematically less “entrepreneurial”.19 This was explained because 
there are two types of start-ups. One type pursues a business opportunity, and
19The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor is an international project led by Paul Reynolds 
(Babson College and the London Business School) aimed at measuring entrepreneurship across 
countries in a comparable way. See www.gemconsortium.org.
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the other type is the result of desperation, of the need to make a living. Generous 
benefit systems are taking away part of the desperation of the unemployed and, 
therefore, decreasing the second type of start-ups. Hence, if we accept the intimate 
connection between firm creation and service sector job creation, generous benefit 
systems can be expected to decrease service employment.
Long unemployment benefits and high wage floors are normally the result of 
strong union power in the country. The regressions include three bargaining related 
variables: union density, union coverage and wage bargaining coordination. The 
first remarkable fact is the lack of significance over all specifications of union 
coverage. The second remark is that both union density and wage bargaining 
coordination affect significantly service employment and unemployment, and are 
relatively unimportant in explaining manufacturing employment. This result is 
consistent with the observed impact of benefits and minimum wages: unionized 
countries have higher union premium, i.e. the relative wage in manufacturing is 
higher, which means that migration to the service sector has been slower.
Start-up costs, and the overall index of product market regulations, have a 
consistent positive and significant sign in the unemployment regression. The 
variable star-up costs is also negative in the service regression and positive in 
the manufacturing regression. Countries where starting a business is cumbersome 
have paid in terms of service employment, and of unemployment. The results are 
reinforced when instead of start-up costs we run the regression with the interaction 
of start-up costs with initial non-service employment. Start-up costs have a higher 
impact when the 1970 share of population of working age outside the service sector 
is larger. In other words, countries that had to go a long way from non-service to 
service economies paid a higher price in terms of unemployment for institutions 
that delayed the sectorial shift.
The impact of the overall index of product market regulations, however, differs
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from the one of start-up costs in both sector employment regressions. It is not 
significant in the service regression and it is significant only at 11% significance level 
(although positive, as the start-up costs) in the manufacturing one. Recall that the 
overall OECD index groups regulations that cover a much wider range of economic 
activities than start-up costs, such as state control over the private sector, barriers 
to international trade or existence of anti-trust exemptions for public enterprises. 
Some of those domains are not, or negatively, correlated to start-up costs so they 
are capturing different phenomena.20 Since service employment takes place at 
small local firms, some of the regulations included in the overall index do not 
apply to them, which could explain the non-significance of the variable in the 
servioe regression.
When start-up costs (or the interaction term) are included in the unemployment 
regression, several labour market institution variables drop. Most dramatic is 
the effect of start-up costs on employment protection legislation. Once start-up 
costs are introduced, EPL does not show up as significant again. This is so in 
almost all specifications we tried and therefore very robust, and is consistent with 
evidence based on job flows. The high correlation between start-up costs and 
EPL (correlation coefficient of 0.73) may explain the significance of EPL in other 
aggregate studies. When minimum wages are included, instead of start-up costs, 
EPL reappears as significant, which seems to confirm the previous remark.
To give an idea of the magnitude of the coefficients, Table 8 reproduces in its 
second column the estimation results for the model of unemployment with start-up 
costs (Table 5, regression 2). The third column of the table shows the variation 
range of each independent variable. The variation is in terms of deviations to the 
cross-country mean, which is taken as reference point. The fourth column shows
20For example, barriers to trade and start-up costs have a correlation coefficient equal to (-.03). 
The two sub-domain of barriers to entrepreneurship, “administrative opcity” and “administrative 
burdens on start-ups,” have a correlation coefficient of (-.17).
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the impact of the same shock on the country with the “best” and the “worst” 
institutional setting, i.e. on the countries with the largest -negative and positive- 
deviations to the cross-country mean. For example, Denmark is the country with 
the lowest start-up costs and Italy the one with the “worst” or largest value 
of the institution among all countries in the sample. The estimations indicate 
that the time dummy would increase unemployment by 7% in a country with 
the average value of all institutions. The country with the highest start-up costs 
would have an additional -relative to the country with average start-up costs- 
increase in unemployment of 1.07%. Denmark, however, would see an increase in 
unemployment 0.57% smaller than the country with the average value of start-up 
costs.
Variable
Coefficients 
from. Table 5, 
column (2)
Range of variation 
of institution
Implied range 
of effect of shock
minimum maximum minimum maximum
Time effect .07
B. Duration .26 -1.93 1.57 -.50 .41
B.R. Rate .02 -46.35 32.65 -1.11 .78
U.Density .02 -30.98 39.02 -.52 .65
Coordination .33 -2.05 1.95 -.68 .65
Start-up costs .38 -1.49 2.80 -.57 1.07
Note: Only coefficients significant at 10% are included in table
Table 8 : Estimated impact of institutions after a common shock
Take the case of a particular country, for example Italy. The average unemployment 
rate in the first period of analysis, 1970-1975, was of 4%. During the last period, 
1995-1997, the average rate was 12%. Hence unemployment increased 8 percentage 
points over the period of analysis. The model with common shocks and time- 
constant institutions predicts an unemployment increase of 6.1% in that same 
period. As the table above shows, 7 percentage points of that predicted increase
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are due to time shocks. The remaining responds to the Italian specific institutional 
framework. Table 9 shows the contribution to the predicted change in unemployment 
of each of the institutions analyzed in the paper for Italy and other four OECD 
countries.
Unemployment: common shocks Belgium Italy Japan UK USA
Actual increase, 1970-97 12% 8% 2% 5% 0%
Predicted increase, 1970-97 14.7% 6.1% 1.7% 7.8% 0.1%
Percentage explained by time 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
(given average institutions)
Percentage explained by institutions 7.7% -0.9% -5.3% 0.8% -6.9%
Benefit system 3.3% -11.3% -3.1% -0.6% -4.7%
EPL 0.5% 0.8% -0.2% -0.3% -0.8%
Union activity 1.1% 1% -2.2% 4.4% 1.1%
Tax Wedge 0.1% 0.9% -0.9% -0.3% -0.3%
ALMP 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.3% 0.8%
Start-up Costs 2.4% 7.5% 0.5% -2.7% -3%
Table 9: Contribution of institutions
Benefit duration and replacement rates have been merged into “Benefit system” 
and union coverage, union density and wage bargaining coordination conform the 
institution “Union activity.” Following with the example of Italy, it is known that 
Italy barely had an unemployment benefit system at all for most of the postwar 
period, hence the negative contribution to  the unemployment increase over the 
period. Union activity, employment protection legislation, the tax wedge and active 
labour market policies have all marginally contributed to the unemployment rise 
in Italy, according to our estimations. The single institution that can explain a 
substantial increase in Italian unemployment is start-up costs.
Turning to the remarkable unemployment performance of the United States, 
very well predicted by the model, we can see that it is almost entirely due to the
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lower than average benefit system and start-up costs. Belgium is the opposite case: 
its bad unemployment records are due to unemployment benefits and start-up costs 
well above the OECD average.
Hence, according to the model with common shocks and time-constant institutions, 
the two single institutions that have contributed the most to the explanation of the 
diverse OECD unemployment evolution are the benefit system (benefit duration 
and replacement rate) and the start-up costs of firms.
Time-varying institutions
All regressions have also been run with time-varying institutions. The data 
come from Nickell and Nunziata' [2002].21 There are at least three problems 
with those regressions, though. First, there are comparable start-up cost data 
across OECD countries for one year only, 1998. Moreover, there are so many 
missing values in the measure of minimum wages that it would be advisable to 
use the time-constant value of minimum wage instead of the time-varying one. 
Therefore, start-up costs and the wage floor are time-constant while all the rest 
of the variables are time-varying (although some do not vary that much). The 
second, smaller, drawback is that time-varying data are available only for six labour 
market institutions, instead of the eight used above. Union coverage and active 
labour market policies are left out of the time-varying analysis. Given that the 
explanatory variables are not entirely independent one of another, this omission 
could affect the results.
Last but not least, institutions change very slowly over time so the value of 
one institution in a country at a certain period is certainly correlated with the 
value of the same institution at the previous or posterior period. This means 
that the institutions’ coefficients could be biased. Indeed, one general feature
21 We have run the regressions with yearly data (485 observations) and five-year average periods 
as before. The results are very similar in both cases.
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of all regressions using time-varying data on institutions is that the estimated 
coefficients are larger, sometimes much larger, than those estimated with time- 
constant institutions. We suspect that this problem could be behind some change 
of signs. Hence, all interpretations have to be done with caution.
The tables can be found in the appendix 1. The unemployment and manufacturing 
regressions replicate in general terms those using time-constant institutions. The 
servioe regression presents some changes. The benefit replacement rate and EPL, 
which were significantly decreasing service employment with time-constant institutions, 
are now positive and, in some regressions, significant. There are three possible 
explanations to the positive sign of EPL and benefit replacement rate: the time 
evolution of both variables has been favorable to service job creation; there is a 
spurious relationship between the rise in service employment and the rise in both 
institutions; or there is a problem of biased coefficients.
To include in the analysis the variation over time of labour and product market 
institutions is necessary. This is only a first attempt in that direction, which shows 
that the main results obtained with time-constant institutions are robust. B u t' 
better data and further econometric work are called for.
2.2.2 Identified shocks
We now turn to identify those shocks that before were left unidentified and captured 
by time dummies. The model to be estimated is as follows:
i k j k
where S ^ t is shock k in country i at time t. One can think about a composite 
of shocks that interacts with the labour market institutions. There are several 
candidates for “bad” shocks that might be responsible for the observed increase in 
unemployment in the OECD countries in the last three decades.
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Blanchard [1999] and then B&W identify three of those shocks: a slowdown 
in the total'factor productivity growth; an increase in the long-term real interest 
rate; and finally, an increase in the capital share, or equivalently, a negative shift 
of labour demand. The focus of this chapter is on sector differential productivity 
growth rather than on aggregate productivity slowdown. It is argued that manufacturing 
and service differential productivity growth is behind the observed employment 
shift to the service sector in developed economies. We claim that countries that 
did not have friendly institutions to service job creation were not able to absorb 
displaced workers from other sectors which resulted in higher unemployment.
To test that claim, the first of B&W shocks, aggregate TFP growth, is substituted 
by the manufacturing to service TFP. Then the interaction of shocks with the 
labour market institutions and start-up costs is used as explanatory variables in 
the unemployment and sector employment regressions.
Sector TFP is proxied by the “filtered” sector labour productivity or labour 
productivity trend, as we explained with some detail in the section dedicated to 
the description of the data. In general terms the first and last period of data are 
missing for all countries, Ireland and Switzerland drop totally and Spain has only 
two periods of data available. Our data set is therefore badly reduced (from 106 to 
78 observation in the best case) so the results of the estimations have to be taken 
with caution.
Tables 10, 11 and 12 show the estimation results of the model with three 
identified shocks, labour demand shift, long-term interest rate, and manufacturing 
to service labour productivity, and time-constant institutions. Column (1) shows 
the estimation of the model only with labour market institutions, column (2) 
includes start-up costs, column (3) substitutes start-up costs by minimum wages, 
and column (4) includes the OECD overall index of product market regulation, in 
place of the administrative burdens on start-ups.
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Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
1 2 3 4
Labour Demand Shift .09 (.07 ) .07 (.05) .09 (.06) .05 (.06)
LR interest rate .04 (.09) .04 (.09) .03 (.09) .05 (.09)
Manufacturing to service L.Prod. .07 (.01) .07 (.01) .07 (.01) .08 (.01)
B. Duration .26 (.11) .35 (.11) .29 (.11) .44 (.12)
B.R.Rate -.02 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01)
EPL .02 (.04) -.12 (.08) .04 (.04) -.09 (.06)
U.Density .04 (.01) .05 (.01) .05 (.01) .02 (.01)
Tax Wedge -.03 (.02) -.05 (.02) -.03 (.02) -.03 (.01)
Coordination .09 (.21) .19 (.19) .10 (.18) .04 (.18)
U.Coverage -.26 (.42) -.32 (.43) -.07 (.44) -.11 (.38)
ALMP -.00 (-01) -.03 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.03 (.01)
Start-up costs .97 (.52)
Minimum Wage -4.2 (2.1)
Product Market Regulation 1.5 (.68)
Wald Test (3 shocks) 83 74 83 92
Observations 78 78 76 .78
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
o When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 10: Identified shocks: unemployment
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Dependent variable: Service employment ratio
1 2 3 4
Labour Demand Shift .16 (.07) .26 (.13) .15 (.07) .20 (.09)
LR interest rate .29 (.11) .30 (.14) .28 (.11) .29 (.12)
Manufacturing to service L.Prod. .16 (.01) .16 (.01) .17 (.02) .15 (.02)
B. Duration -.09 (.04) -.12 (.04) -.07 (.05) -.14 (.05)
B.R.Rate .00 (.00) -.01 (.01) .00 (.02) .00 (.00)
EPL -.03 (.02) .07 (.03) -.03 (.02) .00 (.04)
U.Density -.01 (.01) -.01 (.00) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01)
Tax Wedge -.01 (.01) .00 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01)
Coordination .09 (.11) .00 (.09) .08 (.13) .07 (.11)
U.Coverage -.11 (.29) -.05 (.29) -.02 (.32) -.18 (.32)
ALMP .00 (.01) .02 (.01) .00 (.01) .01 (.01)
Start-up costs -.66 (.26)
Minimum Wage -2.0 (2.6)
Product Market Regulation -.50 (.39)
Wald Test (3 shocks) 278 328 183 278
Observations 78 78 76 78
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 11: Identified shocks: service employment
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Dependent variable: Manufacturing employment ratio
1 2 3 4
Labour Demand Shift .03 (.05) .04 (.05) .03 (.05) .05 (.05)
LR interest rate -.05 (.08) -.05 (.08) -.06 (.09) -.05 (.08)
Manufacturing to service L.Prod. -.12 (.01) -.12 (.01) -.12 (.01) -.12 (.01)
B. Duration .11 (.06) .13 (.07) .11 (.06) .17 (.07)
B.R.Rate -.02 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01)
EPL -.03 (.01) -.07 (.03) -.04 (.01) -.07 (.03)
U.Density .00 (.01) .00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01)
Tax Wedge -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01)
Coordination .07 (.13) .11 (.10) .09 (.14) .07 (.12)
U.Coverage .22 (.19) .22 (.18) .24 (.23) .24 (.19)
ALMP -.03 (.01) -.03 (.01) -.03 (.01) -.04 (.01)
Start-up costs .21 (.22)
Minimum Wage .29 (1.1)
Product Market Regulation .41 (.36)
Wald Test (3 shocks) 165 162 143 164
Observations 78 78 76 78
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 12: Identified shocks: manufacturing
All the three shocks are entered in levels and can be interpreted as deviations 
to the value in the first period of analysis, or as deviations to the country average. 
A Wald test to test for their joint significance has been performed and in all cases 
we can reject the hypotheses of all coefficients being zero.
The first remarkable thing is that the labour demand shift and the long­
term interest rate are not significant in the unemployment and manufacturing 
regressions when sector labour productivity is controlled for.22 On the other hand,
the manufacturing to service labour productivity is always very significant (t-
22When aggregate TFP growth is included instead, the long-term interest rate is significant 
in all regressions. Labour demand shift is dose to significance at 10% level in the 
unemployment regression. B&W found the labour demand shift to be significant. However 
when heteroscedasticity is controlled for, the labour demand shift loses its significance.
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statistics of about 10 in absolute value). That shock is positive in the unemployment 
regression, positive in the service regression and negative in the manufacturing 
regression. All signs are as expected since, according to Baumol [1967], the increase 
in manufacturing productivity relative to service caused the shift of employment 
from non-service to service sectors. Hence it explains the increase in service 
employment and the decrease in manufacturing employment. The second remarkable 
issue is to be found in the service regression. It has been mentioned that the 
increase in manufacturing to service labour productivity increases significantly 
service employment, as expected. The striking thing is that the two other shocks 
included in the analysis, labour demand shift and increase in the interest rate, 
also increase significantly service employment. The most likely explanation is the 
existence of a spurious relationship between the growth in service employment and 
the growth in the capital share and interest rate.
Turning directly to the administrative burdens on start-ups, the focus of this 
chapter, we observe the following. The coefficient of start-up costs is higher than 
with unidentified shocks in all regressions. It is positive and significant at 10% 
significance level in the unemployment regression, very significant and negative, 
in the service regression, and positive but non-significant in the manufacturing 
regression. What these results are telling us is that the shift of employment from 
non-service to service activities had a very high cost in terms of service employment, 
reflected in overall unemployment, in countries where starting a business is more 
cumbersome than average.
The beauty is that when the regression is run with the aggregate TFP growth, 
as in Blanchard and Wolfers [2000], there is no evidence that countries with more 
administrative burdens on firm creation than the average have a worse service 
employment performance.23 Burdens on firm creation become significant only when
23The estimations with aggregate TFP growth, instead of sector differential labour productivity
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interacted with a shock that caused the relocation of large numbers of workers in 
the service sector.
When the overall product market regulation index is included instead of start­
up costs, the results change slightly. Product market regulations, when interacted 
with the sector differential productivity, increase significantly unemployment (this 
result is more significant than when start-up costs were included). The difference, 
as it was the case when regressions were run with time dummies, is to be found 
in the service regression, where product market regulations have a non-significant 
negative coefficient.
Countries with longer benefits than average create less jobs in the service sector 
(where the private initiative is very important), have a larger share of the working 
age population employed in the manufacturing firms and experience, in general, 
higher unemployment than an average country.
With respect to the rest of the institutions, the most remarkable changes 
from before are as follow. First, EPL is non-significant from the beginning in 
Jhe unemployment regression (before it was significant when start-up costs were' 
excluded). In the service regression, EPL goes from being negative and significant 
without start-up costs to positive and significant when they are included. When 
minimum wages are controlled for instead, the sign is again negative (although 
non-significant). Therefore the behavior observed before, when the EPL index 
systematically dropped out when start-up costs were introduced, is here amplified.
To get a feeling of the contribution of the three shocks analyzed in the section to 
the increase in unemployment, let us take a look in more detail to Italy -a  country 
that has experienced a large relocation of workers into the service sector. The 
predicted rise of Italian unemployment over the period is of 7.25%, much closer to 
the actual 8% than the predicted increase of the model with common unidentified
growth, are available in the appendix 1.
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shocks. Of those 7.25 percentage points, shocks (given average institutions) can 
explain a rise equal to 5.7% and institutions explain the remaining 1.5%. The 
shift of employment to the service sector explains alone 5% points of the 5.7% 
corresponding to the shocks.
The large contribution of that shock is a feature of every country; in average 
it accounts for around 60% of the total predicted change in unemployment. That 
figure is quite close to the one given by Marimon and Zilibotti [1998], who calculated 
that almost 80% of the long-run employment differential growth across countries 
and industries is accounted by different initial distribution of labour across industries 
and only 20% by country effects.
We turn now to the contribution of the different institutions to the unemployment 
increase over the period, for Italy and five other OECD countries. Table 13 shows 
that the predictive power of the regression with identified shocks and time-constant 
institutions is generally better than the one with common shocks.
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Unemployment: Identified shocks Belgium Italy Japan UK USA
Actual increase, 1970-97 12% 8% 2% 5% 0%
Predicted increase, 1970-97 10% 7.3% 1% 4.4% -0.2%
Percentage explained by shocks 5.2% 5.7% 1.5% 2.8% 3%
(given average institutions)
Labour Demand Shift -0.3% 0.4% -0.1% -0.3% 0.4%
Long-term Interest Rate 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Manufacturing to service productivity 5.4% 5.1% 1.5% 3% 2.5%
Percentage explained by institutions 4.8% 1.5% -0.5% 1.7% -3.2%
Benefit system 2.8% -3.2% -1.1% 1.6% -2%
EPL* -4.1% -6.6% 0.5% 1.1% 3.4%
Union Activity* 2.3% -0.3% -1% 1.2% -1.3%
Tax wedge -0.2% -3.4% 1% 0.7% 0.7%
ALMP -0.3% -0.4% -0.2% -0.2% -0.7%
Start-up costs 4.4% 15.3% 0.3% -2.8% -3.3%
Institutions with * are non-significant at 10% significance level
Table 13: Contribution of shocks and institutions
The figures in the table have to be taken with extreme caution: employment 
protection legislation is non-significantly different from zero and has reverse sign. , 
So are two of the three variables included in the union activity group. Of the 
rest of significant variables, ALMP and the tax wedge have a negative sign in the 
regression, instead of the expected positive one.
There is a general decrease in the contribution to the unemployment change of 
the benefit system (i.e. in Italy, now the figure is -3.2%, compared to the -11.28% 
in the regression with common unidentified shocks) now that shocks have been 
identified. Secondly, the contribution of start-up costs, now that are interacted 
with identified shocks, to the unemployment rise is very large. That contribution 
is two times as large as the already important contribution of start-up costs when 
shocks were not specified in Italy and Belgium, and approximately the same in 
Japan, UK and USA.
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Taking the results with caution due to the numerous missing values in the data­
set, start-up costs emerge as a relevant variable to explain unemployment given 
the shift of employment from non-services to services experienced by most western 
economies over the last decades.
2.3 Conclusion
This paper argues that countries that had unfriendly institutions to service job 
creation were not able to have a smooth transition towards a service economy, 
with the result of higher unemployment. Given the characteristics of the service 
employment, created in small firms at the local level, one institution that possibly 
hampered service employment is the administrative burdens on firm creation.
The estimations seem to support the working hypotheses of the paper: countries 
with higher start-up costs have significantly lower service employment and higher 
unemployment.
The first set of regressions use time dummies instead of fully specified shocks to 
be able to isolate the impact of the institutions from that of shocks on unemployment. 
The time dummies alone would be able to explain an increase in unemployment of 7 
percentage points in a country with the cross-country average value of institutions. 
The country with the highest start-up costs among all OECD countries, Italy, 
would be penalized with an additional increase in unemployment of 1.07%. When 
the contribution of each institution to the predicted increase in unemployment is 
estimated for the case of Italy, start-up costs emerge as the largest contributor to 
the unemployment rise. On the other hand, employment protection legislation, 
one of the traditional main suspects, appears to have contributed in less than 1 
percentage point to the overall increase.
When institutions are interacted with identified shocks, start-up costs emerge 
again as the institution that has contributed the most to the predicted unemployment
68
increase. In the case of Italy, that contribution is now twice as large as it was when 
no shocks were specified and time dummies were used instead.
In spite of the incomplete data on sector labour productivity, the analysis 
shows that the administrative burdens on firm creation and other product market 
regulations can be blamed for part of the increase in unemployment experienced 
by most western economies in the last three decades. That impact is specially 
important when the size of the employment shift from the agriculture and industry 
sector into the service sector is taken into account.
2.4 A ppendix 1
2.4.1 Tim e-varying institutions
Tables 14, 15 and 16 show the results of the regressions for unemployment, service 
and manufacturing employment respectively with common unidentified shocks 
(time dummies) and time-varying institutions. Please keep in mind that we do 
not have time-varying data for start-up costs and minimum wages. The first 
jolumn of the table includes only labour market institutions (there are no d a ta ' 
for ALMP and union coverage); the second column adds to the six labour market 
institutions the start-up costs; the third column substitutes start-up costs by the 
interaction of start-up costs with the initial non-service employment rate; column 
four substitutes start-up costs by the wage floor; and finally, column five includes 
the overall OECD product market regulation index. All regressions include time 
and country dummies.
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Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
1 2 3 4 5
B. Duration .69 (.24) .87 (.19) .87 (.19) .77 (.24) .62 (.27)
B.R.Rate .55 (.45) 1.2 (.47 1.4 (.51) -.55 (.44) .61 (.49)
EPL .33 (.20) -.15 (.25) -.29 (.24) .12 (.14) .45 (.28)
U.Density -.17 (.56) 1.0 (.56) 1.2 (.51) .63 (.63) -.26 (.61)
Tax Wedge .08 (.65) -1.4 (.57) -1.7 (.57) .69 (.70) .35 (.73)
Coordination -.20 (.13) -.22 (.12) -.19 (.12) -.14 (.13) -.22 (.13)
Start-up costs .48 (.10)
SUC*initial nsv .74 (.13)
Minimum Wage .62 (1.31)
Product Market Regul. -.29 (.29)
Observations 106 106 106 94 106
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
Table 14: Common shocks and time-varying institutions: unemployment
Dependent variable: Service employment ratio
1 2 3 4 5
B. Duration -.00 (.15) -.08 (.13) -.06 (.13) -.07 (.14) .03 (.16)
B.RRate .77 (.29) .43 (.38) .38 (.39) 1.0 (.19) .69 (.32)
EPL .02 (.11) .27 (.17) .32 (.16) .02 (.12) -.06 (.14)
U.Density -.27 (.37) -1.1 (.39) -1.2 (.42) -.82 (.47) -.20 (.38)
Tax Wedge -.53 (.41) .56 (.58) .74 (.62) -.48 (.54) -.72 (.45)
Coordination -.06 (.07) -.02 (.07) -.03 (.07) -.10 (.07) -.06 (.07)
Start-up costs -.27 (.08)
SUC*initial nsv -.39 (.12)
Minimum Wage 1.1 (.93)
Product Market Regul. .19 (.20)
Observations 106 106 106 94 106
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
Table 15: Common shocks and time-varying institutions: services
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Dependent variable: Manufacturing employment ratio
1 2 3 4 5
B. Duration .23 (.25) .41 (.18) .39 (.18) .06 (.24) .28 (.22)
B.R.Rate -.48 (.48) .19 (.39) .21 (.40) -1.5 (.42) -.57 (.41)
EPL .05 (.22) -.51 (.23) -.55 (.25) -.46 (.23) -.07 (.28)
U.Density -.24 (.38) .97 (.36) .91 (.38) -1.1 (.40) -.16 (.39)
Tax Wedge 1.5 (.73) .08 (.63) .17 (.66) 1.9 (.58) 1.3 (.77)
Coordination -.05 (.15) -.05 (.13) -.02 (.14) .09 (.14) -.04 (.15)
Start-up costs .50 (.10)
SUC* initial nsv .64 (.13)
Minimum Wage 5.2 (.99)
Product Market Regul. .26 (.27))
Observations 106 106 106 94 106
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
Table 16: Common shocks and time-varying institutions: manufacturing
2.4.2 Blanchard and  W olfers’ identified shocks
Table 17, 18 and 19 show the results of the regressions using the shocks identified 
by B&W, i.e. labour demand shift, long-term interest rate and aggregate TFP 
growth. The first column shows the results of the model only with labour market 
institutions; column two includes start-up costs; column three substitutes start-up 
costs by the wage floor; and finally, the fourth column includes the overall OECD 
product market regulation index.
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Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
1 2 3 4
Labour Demand Shift .18 (.12 ) .18 (.11) .20 (.12) .18 (.12)
LR interest rate .43 (.12) .43 (.12) .43 (.11) .43 (.12)
Annual TFP growth .51 (.24) .51 (.22) .43 (.30) .50 (.24)
B. Duration .38 (.09) .41 (.09) .37 (.11) .39 (.10)
B.R.Rate .02 (.01) .04 (.01) .01 (.02) .02 (.01)
EPL .07 (.04) .00 (.04) .06 (.09) .07 (.04)
U.Density .04 (.02) .05 (.02) .04 (.03) .04 (.02)
Tax Wedge .06 (.02) .03 (.02) .04 (.02) .05 (.02)
Coordination .50 (.15) .57 (.15) .14 (.31) .52 (.17)
U.Coverage -.36 (.37) -.22 (.37) -.34 (.57) -.34 (.38)
ALMP .02 (.02) .01 (.03) .05 (.04) .02 (.02)
Start-up costs ■ t .68 (.26)
Minimum Wage -2.9 (2.4)
Product Market Regulation .09 (.34)
Wald Test (3 shocks) 103 109 47 83
Observations 113 113 80 113
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 17: Blanchard and Wolfers’ shocks: unemployment
72
Dependent variable: Service employment ratio
1 2 3 4
Labour Demand Shift .04 (.11 ) .05 (.13) .56 (.15) .06 (.15)
LR interest rate 1.1 (.16) 1.1 (.18) .74 (.15) 1.1 (.18)
Annual TFP growth .67 (.32) .66 (.32) .69 (.27) .71 (.35)
B. Duration -.12 (.06) -.14 (.06) .05 (.06) -.14 (.06)
B.R.Rate .00 (.01) -.01 (.01) .00 (.00) .00 (.01)
EPL -.05 (.03) -.02 (.04) -.02 (.03) -.04 (.03)
U.Density -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01)
Tax Wedge .01 (.01) .02 (.02) .01 (.01) .01 (.02)
Coordination -.09 (.13) -.14 (.14) -.13 (.18) -.14 (.15)
U.Coverage .10 (.31) .02 (.30) -.16 (.32) .05 (.31)
ALMP -.01 (-02) -.00 (.02) .02 (.01) -.01 (.02)
Start-up costs -.30 (.31)
Minimum Wage .39 (2.3)
Product Market Regulation -.23 (.49)
Wald Test (3 shocks) 149 159 89 128
Observations 113 113 80 113
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 18: Blanchard and Wolfers’ shocks: service employment
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Dependent variable: Manufacturing employment mtio
1 2 3 4
Labour Demand Shift .08 (.10 ) .09 (.08) -.14 (.12) .07 (.12)
LR interest rate -.61 (.09) -.60 (.08) -.60 (.10) -.61 (.09)
Annual TFP growth -.42 (.18) -.42 (.17) -.53 (.18) -.43 (.19)
B. Duration .19 (.08) .22 (.08) .28 (.08) .18 (.10)
B.R.Rate -.01 (.01) .01 (.01) .00 (.01) -.01 (.01)
EPL -.01 (.03) -.07 (.04) .01 (.04) -.00 (.04)
U.Density -.01 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01)
Thx Wedge .02 (.01) .00 (.02) .03 (.01) .02 (.01)
Coordination -.03 (.13) .10 (.14) .09 (.14) -.06 (.14)
U.Coverage -.36 (.37) .28 (.37) .05 (.38) .04 (.31)
ALMP .08 (.35) -.05 (.02) -.00 (.02) -.03 (.02)
Start-up costs • i .53 (.28)
Minimum Wage .43 (1.8)
Product Market Regulation -1.5 (.54)
Wald Test (3 shocks) 83 137 55 137
Observations 110 110 80 110
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 19: Blanchard and Wolfers’ shocks: manufacturing
All the three shocks are entered in levels and can be interpreted as deviations to 
the value in the first period of analysis, or as deviations to the country average. All 
shocks are imputed so their expected impact on unemployment is positive, which 
means that TFP growth has been multiplied by (-1).
Let us start with the three identified shocks of B&W. We have performed a 
Wald test to test for their joint significance and in all cases we can reject the 
hypotheses of all coefficients being zero. The shock “shift in labour demand” is 
in the unemployment regression close to be significant only at 10% significance 
level. In the rest of the regressions it is not significant. B&W do find that the 
labour demand shift is significant in their unemployment regressions. We also did
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so when heteroscedasticity was not controlled for. Once robust standard errors are 
estimated, the significance of the labour demand shift disappears.
The other two shocks included in the specification, change in the long-term 
real interest rate and decrease in the TFP growth, are always significant. They 
increase unemployment, as expected, they decrease manufacturing employment, 
also as expected, and they increase service employment... not quite as expected. 
The positive impact on service employment of the secular increase in long-term 
interest rates could be the result of the existence of a spurious relationship.
The positive coefficient of annual TFP growth in the service regression becomes 
non-significant when the manufacturing to service labour productivity is controlled 
for. That is, the overall decrease in total factor productivity is picking up the 
decrease in service labour productivity (relative to manufacturing productivity). 
Hence, it makes sense that the sign of the shock is negative in the manufacturing 
regression and positive in the service one.
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3 Daring to invest in job creation? The impact 
of risk-aversion on unemployment
Entrepreneurial activity is ultimately determined at the individual level. Start-up 
costs are one of the variables the individual takes into account when assessing the 
risks arid rewards associated to entrepreneurship. But risk-aversion, or how much 
the individual weights the expected loss with respect to the possible revenue, is 
decisive for the outcome of such an assessment. This chapter addresses the impact 
of risk-aversion ori the individual decision to become an entrepreneur, as well as 
on equilibrium unemployment and wages.
Knight in 1921 viewed entrepreneurs as the ultimate bearers of uncertainty. 
Either by financing a start-up with her own assets or by resorting to credit under 
full liability, the wealth of an entrepreneur is subject to substantial risk (in the 
middle ages it was not only the wealth of the entrepreneur but also her life what was 
at stake). If the entrepreneurial risk is not fully insured, the common assumption 
of risk-neutrality on firms might not be justified and, more importantly, might be 
missing part of the story.
Table 20 shows the percentage of respondents in different countries who answered 
affirmatively when asked whether the fear of failure would prevent them from 
starting a business.24
24The survey was commanded by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). It covered 
a random representative sample of 2000 adults in each country. The GEM is one of the few 
projects aiming at measuring entrepreneurship across countries. For more information please 
refer to www.gemconsortimn.org.
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Would, the fear of failure -prevent 
you from starting a business?
Country % YES
USA 19.1
Canada 23.7
UK 26.4
India 28.2
Finland 28.4
Australia 33.1
Spain 33.1
Japan 39.0
France 41.2
Italy 42.1
Germany 44.5
Source: GEM 1999
Table 20: Fear of failure
The numbers of the table above can reflect one of two things, or, most likely, a 
combination of both: if risk-aversion is assumed, individuals are expressing their 
fear of failure because they weight more the expected losses than the expected 
gains, even if they are the same; if risk-neutrality is assumed instead, individuals 
are expressing their fear of failure because the expected losses are larger than the 
gains. Examination of the table suggests that, in either case, the fear of failure is 
preventing many potential entrepreneurs from starting a business. And given that 
firm creation has been found to be an important source of new jobs, we expect 
the fear of failure to have a sizeable effect on the employment performance of a 
country.
In this chapter we will explore the first possibility hinted above, i.e., we will 
assume that individuals are risk-averse and then explore the implications that 
such an assumption has on the labour market equilibrium. The next chapter will
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assume instead risk-neutrality along with the existence of a cost of failure. Then 
we will analyse how changing the failure cost affects the supply of entrepreneurs 
and aggregate employment.
The basic ingredients required for the current analysis are three: (1) a model 
of equilibrium unemployment; (2) risky new business creation; and (3) risk-averse 
individuals.
With respect to the first ingredient, we model a labour market with frictions 
which is characterized by the coexistence of vacancies and unemployment. The 
heterogeneities are not modelled explicitly but through a matching function. Therefore 
the model owes much to Pissarides [2000]. However, the wage setting mechanism 
is not a Nash-bargain between the firm and the worker but wage posting prior 
to the search, in the spirit of Peters [1991], Montgomery [1991], Moen [1997] and 
Acemoglu and Shimer [1999, 2000]. In contrast to these papers, we assume that 
both workers and entrepreneurs are risk-averse (see in particular Acemoglu and 
Shimer [1999], who assume risk-averse workers but risk-neutral firms).
It is often said in business schools that successful new ventures require two 
things: a good idea and a good team. Following that spirit, we model the creation 
of new businesses as a two-stage process. During the first stage the firm tests the 
market for the business idea. This trial period requires an initial investment, that 
seed capital will come from the entrepreneur’s own savings, and does not yield 
output or profits. The 1995 Eurostat study on “Enterprises in Europe” estimated 
the rate of failure of new entrants in the European Union to be 20% after the first 
year, going up to 35% after three years. Therefore, there is a substantial risk of 
the business fading before it makes a start. That risk will be called in this paper 
the new entrant risk. If the idea proves to be workable, the firm posts a vacancy 
to hire a worker and start production. The existence of labour market frictions 
introduces the uncertainty about the arrival of good workers to hiring firms. In
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case of match failure the firm loses its initial investment. The risk due to the 
labour market frictions is associated to the production phase of the start-up and 
will be called labour market risk.
Both types of risks can be calculated by the entrepreneur, hence we are not 
before true and uninsurable uncertainty in the Knight sense. Therefore we need 
to assume that, even in that case, insurance markets are not complete. Then the 
assumption of risk-averse individuals can be justified.
One of the few models where firms are assumed risk-averse is Kihlstrom and 
Laffont [1979], who model the occupational choice of risk-averse individuals. In 
equilibrium, those more risk-averse choose optimally to be workers while those 
less risk-averse choose to become entrepreneurs. In this paper we do not model 
occupational choice, focusing instead on the labour market, which Kihlstrom and 
Laffont [1979] assume to be competitive. However, we will assume the same ranking 
of risk preferences that characterises their equilibrium for our calibrations.
The supply side of this paper bears similarities to the literature on portfolio 
fhoice with multiple assets under imperfect insurance: a risk-averse agent will' 
have the choice to invest her initial assets in something risky, like starting a new 
business, or in something riskless. Costain [1999] is a good example of a paper of 
this body of literature that uses a similar set of assumptions -imperfect insurance 
and multiple assets- to study something totally different, namely, a business cycle 
propagation mechanism.
The stress on entrepreneurship, understood as the willingness to take risks 
or entrepreneurial spirit, as a key element of the macroeconomic performance of 
countries is to be found in the growing literature on entrepreneurship. Some 
articles measuring cross-country variations of entrepreneurship are Reynolds et 
al. [1994, 1995], Blanchflower [1998], and OECD Employment Outlook of July 
1992, and July 2000. Empirical papers testing what might foster entrepreneurship
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are Blanchflower and Oswald [1990], Alba-Ramirez [1994], Acs and Evans [1994], 
Evans and Leighton [1989], and Evans and Jovanovic [1989].
When entrepreneurs are assumed risk-averse, instead of risk-neutral, the labour 
market equilibrium is characterized by higher wages and fewer vacancies, that is, 
higher unemployment. Risk-aversion has two different, but reinforcing, effects on 
the equilibrium. First, it impacts on the wage decision of entrepreneurs. Risk- 
averse entrepreneurs will post higher wages in order to enhance the probability 
of finding a suitable worker for the post, or in other words, in order to reduce 
the labour market risk Second, for every wage level, the risk-premium associated 
to the opening of a vacancy is now higher so the entrepreneurial option will be 
relatively less attractive. The result is an equilibrium with higher wages, fewer 
active firms, and more unemployment.
The following section of the paper describes the economy, workers and firms, 
the matching technology and the equilibrium. Section 2 of the chapter solves the 
model and section 3 demonstrates some comparative static results. In section 4 
the model is calibrated and, finally, section 5 concludes.
3.1 The m odel
The model is static with a single matching round between firms and workers. As 
demonstrated by Acemoglu and Shimer [1999], this simple framework is able to 
capture important results about risk-aversion.
There is a continuum [0,1] of identical workers, in terms of productivity and 
reservation wage, all endowed with one unit of labour.25 There is also a large 
number of identical potential firms endowed with some initial assets. We do not 
consider the existence of any financial institution in this chapter. There are two 
reasons for that. The first one is because we will introduce banks and study their
25Workers’ heterogeneity is not modelled explicitely but implicitely in the matching function.
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optimal behaviour with great detail in the next chapter. The second reason is 
because we want to capture the fact that the main source of capital of start-ups is 
the entrepreneur’s own assets (or those of friends and family).
The value of production is assumed to be equal across firms, therefore, entrepreneurs’ 
ability is assumed homogeneous. Under these simplifying assumptions there will 
be a unique wage in equilibrium.
Workers and firms have a continuous strictly increasing concave utility function 
over final consumption u(x). Individuals consume an homogeneous gpod with price 
normalized to one.
3 .1 il Firms
All firms start off with the same level of initial assets A 26 That level is assumed 
to be the same for all although that is not crucial for the analysis; an exogenous 
distribution of wealth could also be assumed.
Potential firms can become active, in which case they pay a cost, exogenously 
fixed at c, to enter the market with a new idea. That initial investment can be. 
thought of as the cost of trying the market for the new idea before deciding to post 
a vacancy and start production. We could also think of it as the administrative 
cost of starting a new firm.
Only a proportion A of new ventures go successfully through that initial period, 
which for convenience is assumed not to yield any output or profits. The remaining 
start-ups fail, which implies the loss of the initial investment c. Successful firms will 
hire a worker to start production. It is assumed that firms are small, each has one
vacancy that is posted in the labour market with an associated wage.27 Once the
26We do not model explicitly the financial sector so the only source of capital available to 
firms is their own initial endowment. Even if we modelled the financial sector, unless it was 
assumed perfect, the initial endowment of firms would be important. Banerjee and Newman 
[1993], Boadway et al. [1998] and Chamley [1983] show that under capital market imperfections 
only individuals with assets above a certain threshold become entrepreneurs.
27The number of active firms is equal to the number of vacancies open and each firm is
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vacancy is in the market, it is matched with a suitable worker with probability rj 
and it remains idle with probability 1 —77. In the latter case the start-up investment 
is lost. If the vacancy is filled, and therefore the job is created, production takes 
place. All potential firms have access to the same technology which requires one 
worker to produce p units of the consumption good.
Potential firms could also remain inactive from a productive point of view, 
investing in a riskless area yielding a known gross return p.
Figure 7 is intended to clarify the different possibilities open to the potential 
firm.
Invest in riskless asset
Successful match: 
production
Potential
Firm Trial period 
successful: open 
vacancy
(Unsuccessful match: 
lose initial investment
Become active: 
Pay starting cost
Trial period 
unsuccessful: lose 
investment
Figure 7: Alternatives open to the potential firm
The probability of successful business creation is the probability that the idea
proves to be good times the probability that the entrepreneur finds a good team.
headed by one entrepreneur. Hence we will refer interchangeably to active firms, entrepreneurs 
or vacancies.
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In that case, the payoff will be the profit after wages and start-up costs have been 
paid Thus, the expected utility from business creation is
^(business creation) =  tjXu {A — c — w) -f (1 — rj\)u (A — c) (3)
The absence of a capital market implies that wealth should be non-negative in 
all states of nature. That restriction imposes a lower bound on the initial level of 
wealth: A  > c, i.e., the initial endowment is required to cover the initial opening 
cost of the firm.
3.1.2 Workers
There is a pool of identical workers, all of which are unemployed and searching for
a job at the beginning of the period. We assume that when unemployed, a worker’s
consumption is equal to zero. Workers observe wages offered in the economy
and apply for jobs on the basis of expected utility maximization. Depending on
the application decisions of workers, there might be more competitors for some. 
•
vacancies (with a certain wage associated) than others. The number of applicants 
for a certain vacancy will be the only determinant of the probability of being hired 
for that vacancy, which we denote by /i. Given that probability of exiting the 
unemployment pool, the expected utility of a searcher who applies to a wage w  
can be written as follows:
^(worker) =  fiu(w) +  (1 — fj)u( 0) (4)
3.1.3 M atching
Firms and workers come together through search. There is a variety of arguments 
able to explain the coexistence of vacancies and unemployed in the market in a 
wage posting framework. Moen [1997] argues that the labour market is segmented
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in sub-markets composed of a set of vacancies offering a certain wage and a set 
of searchers applying to that wage. The coexistence of vacancies and unemployed 
in the sub-markets is explained via standard search frictions. In the papers of 
Montgomery [1991] and Peters [1991] unemployment results from an uncoordinated 
application process by workers which leads to overcrowding in some jobs and no 
applications to others.
The number of matches is given by the matching function m = m (uj, Vj ) ,  where 
Uj is the number of searchers applying to the wage Wj and Vj is the number of 
vacancies offering that waga The matching function is assumed to be homogenous 
of degree one, increasing in both arguments and concave.
In order to capture the fact that some vacancies might receive multiple applications 
within the period while others might receive none, the concept of “expected queue 
length associated to a wage w f , denoted by q7-, is introduced. The expected queue 
is an endogenous measure of competition. It is defined as the ratio of applicants 
to the wage Wj to vacancies offering that wage:
qj = — £ [0, oo] (5)
Vj
A vacancy will be matched to a worker and become a job with probability 
m Using the homogeneity assumption, and 5,
ra(Uj,Vj) / / X
 =  ra te , 1) =  *7te) (6)Vj
with r)'(qj) > 0. Similarly, the probability at which the unemployed change status
to become employed is , which, as above, can be rewritten as
^  = (7)
uj Qj Qj
with g!{qj) < 0.
The transition probabilities from vacancy to job, and from unemployment to 
employment, are therefore dependent on the expected queue associated to the wage.
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The longer the expected queue, the higher the chances of finding a candidate for 
the post. On the other hand, if many applicants compete for the same post, the 
probability to be hired for each of them decreases.
3.1.4 Equilibrium  
Definition
An allocation is a tuple {W, Q, U, V} where W  E R+ is a set of posted wages; 
Q = Q(W) : R+ — ► R+ is the set of associated queues; U E R+ is workers’ utility 
level and V  E R+ is the expected utility from a vacancy opening..
An equilibrium is an allocation {W*,Q*,U* ,V*} such that:
• Given the expected queues associated to wages, qe(w), the expected utility 
from a vacancy is maximized:28Vt(;,
V* > rj(qe(w))Xu(A — c +  p — w) +  (1 — rj(qe(w))X)u(A — c)
with equality if w E W* and
A V* =  sup [q{(f{w))Xu{A — c + p — w )+  (1 — r](qe(w))X)u(A — c)];
• The existence of a large number of potential firms ensures free-entry, which 
drives the utility gains from opening a vacancy to zero in equilibrium ( Vacancy 
Equilibrium Condition or VEC):
r]{q(w))Xu(A — c+ p  — w) + { 1 — r](q(w))X)u(A — c) > u{Ap) 
with equality if w E W* and q E Q*\
•  All wage offers deliver the same expected utility to workers: Via, q(w),
U* > p(q(w))u(w) +  (1 -  p(q(w)))u(0)
with equality if w E W* and q E Q* where
28Rational expectations imply that expectations are correct in equilibrium, qe(w) =  q(w)
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U* =  sup [p(q(w))u(w) +  (1 -  fi(q{w)))u(0) \ .
Firms have to choose wages so, given the expected queue lengths, the expected 
utility from the vacancy is maximized. Free-entry drives the utility gains to zero. 
The optimal choice of firms is subject to each wage offer delivering the same 
expected utility to all workers. This sub-game equilibrium also implies that firms 
do not have any incentive to deviate from the profit-maximizing wage level.
Equilibrium unemployment is calculated as the number of workers not matched 
at the end of the period, which will depend on the equilibrium wage and associated
29queue:
= (8)
Characterization
The firms’ maximization problem subject to all wage offers delivering the same 
expected utility to workers yields the same solution as its dual problem, the 
maximization of workers’ utility subject to the Vacancy Equilibrium Condition.
We will solve the model by means of the second alternative, the optimal 
application problem of the workers. Thus the equilibrium will be characterized 
as follows:
If {W*,Q* ,U*,V*} is an equilibrium, then any w  £ W*,q £ Q* will solve the 
following constrained maximization problem
M axWtqfi(q)u(w) +  (1 -  /x(g))it(0) 
s.t 
7](q(w))Xu(A — c 4- V — w) 4- (1 — rj(q(w))X)u(A — c) = u(Ap) 
w > 0
29To simplify notation we will omit the argument of the queue length and write q instead of 
q(w).
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Conversely, if some w ,q solve this program, then there exits an equilibrium 
{W *,Q\U*,V*} such that w  € W*,q G Q \U * =  n((/)u(v/) +  (1 -  
n(q'))u(0) and
V* =  7 ] ( ( / )X u ( A  — c + p  — u f )  +  (1 — ri(tf)\)u(A — c)
An equilibrium always exists, as demonstrated by Acemoglu and Shimer (1999).
Uniqueness follows from the curvature assumptions.
Montgomery [1991] and Moen [1997] prove that if firms were assumed heterogeneous
in the value of production, then each would find it optimal to offer a different
wage and there would be a distribution of wages in equilibrium. Acemoglu and
Shimer [1999] show that if workers are different in terms of reservation wage or risk-
aversion, the market gets segmented and each segment caters with the preferences
of each type of workers. Even with identical workers but different search intensities
there would be a distribution of wages in equilibrium. In this model, firms and
workers are homogeneous so there will be only one equilibrium wage and associated 
•queue.
3.2 Solving the m odel
A constant absolute risk aversion utility function for both firms and workers is 
assumed,
u(x) = — e~^*x, s =  / ,  zu (9)
where 7  ^ is the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion of potential firms and the 
coefficient corresponding to workers.
The optimal application problem of workers can be written as
M axwq - f i ( q ) e ^ w -  (1 -  fi(q)) s.t. (10)
87
n (q)Xe^M-<*P-’“) +  (1 -  n{ q ) \ ) e - y ^  = e ^ Ap 
' . w > 0
Denoting by T  the Lagrange multiplier and recalling that 77(g) =  fi(q)q, the 
three first-order conditions are given by
- y „ e ^ w =  — TqX-f
1  _  e - 7 ro^  =  Je - 7 / ( ^ - c + P - w ; )  _  e - 7 / ( A - c ) j if ls i
M'(«).
fi(q)q\e^!i(A cAv ^  +  (1 — fl(q)qX)e '!f(A c) =  e
Dividing 12 by 11 and rearranging 13 we obtain
1
( i i )
(12)
(13)
eiwwm — 1  'Y,„
e-r,(p j^j-) _  j 7 / a6s(£)J) -  1
K«*)9* =
_  p - l ( A - c )
(14)
(15)A [e- 7(^-c-+7>-u>*) _  e —7( 4^—c)]
where is the elasticity of the transition probability from unemployment to 
employment with respect to the queue length.
Empirical work has shown that a log-linear approximation to the matching 
function fits the data well.30 In that case, the functional relation between the 
number of matchings per period and the stock of unemployed and vacancies would 
be
with transition probabilities
„ . c * l —a  m = Uj Vj (16)
tiQj)
V(Qj)
— ( 1 — a )
ii (17)
30 See Petrongolo and Pissarides [2001].
Given that matching function, the elasticity of the employment probability 
with respect to the queue length would be constant and equal in absolute value 
to the elasticity of matching to vacancies: = — (1 — a). That is, given a certain
stock of unemployment, 1% increase in the number of vacancies posting a certain 
wage (which is equivalent to 1% decrease in the queue associated to that wage) 
results in (1 — a)% increase in matching^. The fact that is constant is a very 
convenient feature of the log-linear matching function because it implies that the 
equilibrium wage in this model does not depend on the expected queue length but 
on exogenous parameters.
If we assumed another matching function, that would not be the case anymore. 
To see that, let’s assume that the only labour market frictions are lack of coordination 
of workers’ actions. Then the number of matches that takes place at each application 
round can be written simply as
m  = Vi i  — ( i  — —
vi
(18)
jvhich for large Vj is well approximated by
m  =  Vj [l — e-^] (19)
The elasticity of the employment probability with respect to the queue length 
can now be written as ~ 1 with • One can see from
expression 14 that the equilibrium wage would in that case decrease with the 
expected queue length. The way of understanding that negative relationship is 
the following. From the expression for the elasticity given above, L i m i t =  0. 
hi that situation a worker will find it optimal to apply to the highest possible 
wage vacancy because the associated high queue will not have an impact on 
the employment probability. As the queue increases so does the elasticity of 
employment to the queue in absolute value, and the optimal wage decreases.
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With either matching function the main qualitative results of the model are 
the same.
The system of equations 14 and 15 determine together the equilibrium values 
of the wage and queue length. Figure 8  shows graphically the equilibrium as 
the intersection of two curves in the (w, q) space. The first equation shows the 
equilibrium wage level which, assuming a Cobb-Douglas matching function, depends 
on the exogenous parameters of risk-aversion, productivity and elasticity of matching 
with respect to unemployment. On the other hand, 15 or the Vacancy Equilibrium 
Condition is upward-sloping. The reason is that, in equilibrium, a higher wage has 
to be associated with a longer queue so the expected utility gains from opening a 
vacancy are zero.
w
Vacancy
Equilibrium
Condition
Wage equation
w*
q* q
Figure 8: Equilibrium of the labour market 
Given the parameters of the model, workers apply for a given wage. The
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Vacancy Equilibrium Condition determines the equilibrium number of active firms
associated to that wage level, and therefore the equilibrium unemployment.
3.3 Com parative Statics
The idea of this section is to examine how a change in parameters, specially of 
risk-aversion, affects the equilibrium wage and queue (and unemployment).
The section starts with the impact of workers’ risk-aversion on equilibrium 
wages and unemployment.
Proposition 1 Workers’ risk-aversion decreases equilibrium wages and reduces 
equilibrium queues, which results in lower unemployment.
Proof. See appendix 2. ■
Both entrepreneurs and workers face the labour market risk, that is, the risk 
of not being matched with an appropriate worker or vacancy because of the 
existence of labour market frictions. Risk-averse workers will try to avoid the 
risk of unemployment by applying to low wage vacancies, because their chances 
of being employed in them are higher. That is the explanation for the negative 
impact of workers’ risk-aversion on equilibrium wages.
Workers’ risk-aversion does not impact directly on equilibrium queues and 
unemployment. Equilibrium queues will only change as a response to the change in 
wages. Intuitively, as wages decrease, the expected utility from entrepreneurship 
increases so more firms will decide to become active. The equilibrium is restored 
because more vacancies imply shorter queues to every wage, which decreases the 
chances of firms to hire an appropriate worker for the post and, therefore, decreases 
the expected utility from the entrepreneurial venture back to the equilibrium level.
Acemoglu and Shimer [1999] find the same result in their model with risk- 
averse workers and risk-neutral firms. They go one step further and claim that 
firms respond to the wish of workers for low-wage jobs by creating low-quality
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vacancies and therefore under-investing. That is why unemployment insurance 
might be efficient in this context.
Figure 9 shows graphically the impact of workers’ risk-aversion on equilibrium.
w
Vacancy
Equilibrium
Condition
w O',
q
Figure 9: Impact of workers’ risk-aversion on equilibrium
Starting from the equilibrium A, workers’ risk-aversion decreases equilibrium 
wages. The new equilibrium is at B with a lower wage and a shorter queue (and 
therefore lower unemployment).
The contribution of this paper is, however, the analysis of how entrepreneurs’ 
risk-aversion impacts upon the labour market equilibrium, which is what is analyzed 
next.
Entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion affects the equilibrium unemployment in two reinforcing 
ways: first, it increases equilibrium wages, which in turn affects the queue length. 
Second, it increases the risk premium associated to the entrepreneurial venture for
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every wage level, which decreases further the number of active firms in equilibrium.
Proposition  2 Entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion increases equilibrium wages and queues, 
which results in higher unemployment.
Proof. See appendix 2. ■
For every wage level, an increase in risk-aversion will cause the risk-premium 
associated to entrepreneurship to increase, so there will be less active firms in the 
equilibrium. But the wage level is also affected by entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion. 
The reason is the same as in the case of workers’ risk-aversion, i.e. to reduce 
the labour market risk. Risk-averse entrepreneurs will try to reduce the risk of 
not being matched with a worker in a labour market with frictions by posting 
higher wages. Higher wages reduce the expected utility from opening a vacancy so 
the equilibrium number of active firms will decrease further, and correspondingly, 
unemployment will increase.
Figure 10 shows graphically the impact of entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion upon 
equilibrium.
Once again, the departing point is at A. Entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion increases 
equilibrium wages on the one hand. On the other hand, it shifts the Vacancy 
Equilibrium Condition to the right because now for every wage level the expected 
utility associated to opening a firm is lower.
Risk-sharing could have potential important effects on the labour market. 
According to the model, insuring entrepreneurs against the labour market risk 
would decrease equilibrium wages and make the entrepreneurial venture more 
attractive for risk-averse individuals. Insuring entrepreneurs against the new entrant 
risk would not affect directly wages but still encourage more individuals to become 
entrepreneurs. Fan and White [2002] propose in their paper to increase the bankruptcy 
exemption levels to provide partial wealth insurance to risk-averse entrepreneurs.
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Vacancy
Equilibrium
Condition
q
w f2
Figure 10: Impact of entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion on equilibrium
We will come back to the potential benefits of changing the bankruptcy law in the 
next chapter.
Apart from the risk-aversion coefficients, the paper considers other parameters 
of interest, such as the start-up cost, the interest rate or the entrepreneurs’ wealth.
The next proposition explores briefly the impact of each of such parameters on 
equilibrium.
Proposition  3 Productivity increases the equilibrium wage and reduces equilibrium 
queues and unemployment. An increase in the initial level of assets, riskless return, 
starting cost, and new entrant risk increases equilibrium queues and unemployment 
but does not change the equilibrium wage.
Proof. See appendix 2. ■
Productivity increases equilibrium wages, which impacts negatively on employment. 
However, productivity has also a direct impact on the expected utility from a
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vacancy. It can be proven that the latter effects dominates. Hence the effect of 
productivity is to increase equilibrium wages and to reduce queues and unemployment.
The impact of an increase in the initial assets of potential firms will be to 
decrease the number of firms in equilibrium. Therefore the equilibrium queue and 
unemployment will increase. This result holds only under constant absolute risk- 
aversion utility function. If we assumed instead a constant relative risk-aversion 
function, an increase of assets would reduce relative risk-aversion and, therefore, 
increase the number of vacancies in equilibrium.
An increase in the riskless gross return and the new entrant risk (that is, a 
decrease in A) will discourage potential firms and result in an increase in equilibrium 
queue length and unemployment. Increasing the start-up cost will unambiguously 
increase unemployment, which is consistent with the empirical evidence given in 
the previous chapter. Under the assumption of a log-linear matching function, 
all those parameters will not change the equilibrium wage. They will only affect 
the equilibrium number of active firms. If another matching function, like the 
pne given in 19 was assumed, an increase in the parameters would increase the' 
equilibrium queue and decrease the wage.
3.4 Calibration
To get an idea of the impact on equilibrium of the two main parameters, workers’ 
and entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion, the model has been calibrated. The equilibrium 
wage, queue and unemployment are given respectively by 14, 15 and 8. The 
assumed matching function is the one in 19, which has the advantage of delivering 
properly bounded transition probabilities.
The table below gives the values of the parameters used in the calibration:
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Parameter values
Productivity (p) 4
Initial assets (A) 1
Gross riskless return (p) 1.1
Starting cost (c) 0.1
New entrant success (A) 0.9
Table 21 : Parameter values
The assumed parameters are a bit extreme in order to deliver reasonable 
unemployment rates in a model without job destruction (and still the unemployment 
rates are very high).
3.4.1 Impact o f workers’ risk-aversion on equilibrium
Table 22 gives the equilibrium values of the wage, queue and associated unemployment 
as the workers’ absolute risk-aversion parameter changes from 1 to 4. Entrepreneurs’ 
risk-aversion coefficient is assumed to be equal to l .31
7*7 1 7*7 =  2 7^ =  3 7*7=4
w*
q*
unemployment rate
2.72
0.33
14%
2.15
0.27
12%
1.74
0.25
11%
1.46
0.25
11%
Table 22: Workers’ risk-aversion
Risk-averse workers apply for lower wage jobs to avoid the unemployment 
risk. The only impact of workers’ risk-aversion on the equilibrium queue and 
unemployment rate is through that effect on wages. Lower wages increase the 
expected utility from opening a business and therefore the equilibrium will be
31 According to Kihlstrom and Laffont [1979], we assume that the absolute coefficient of risk- 
aversion of entrepreneurs is smaller than the corresponding to workers.
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characterized by more firms, and less unemployment. However the effect of risk- 
aversion on queues and unemployment seems to fade out soon.
3.4.2 Im pact of en trepreneurs’ risk-aversion on equilibrium
Table 23 shows the impact on equilibrium of the entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion. 
Workers’ risk-aversion is assumed to be 4.
7f =  1 7 f =  2 7f = 3 I f  =  4
w*
q*
unemployment mte
1.46
0.25
11%
1.66
0.46
19%
1.87
0.69
27%
2.05
0.95
35%
Thble 23: Entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion
The impact of entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion on unemployment is much larger. 
The reason is that the absolute coefficient of risk-aversion affects both the wage 
level and the risk-premium from entrepreneurship. Both effects reinforce each other 
and increase the equilibrium queue and unemployment. Recall that there is not 
job destruction so the unemployment rates are disproportionately large. In spite 
of that, the table shows that assuming risk-averse entrepreneurs, instead of the 
traditional risk-neutrality assumption can explain a large rise in the equilibrium 
unemployment rate. And contrary to what happened with workers’ risk-aversion, 
further increases in entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion continue having an important 
impact on the unemployment rate.
3.5 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to examine the impact of risk preferences on labour 
market performance when, not only workers, but also firms are assumed risk- 
averse. Small and entrepreneurial firms are becoming the main source of new jobs
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in developed economies. The main role of the entrepreneur, according to Knight 
[1921], is to1 be the bearer of true or uninsurable uncertainty. Hence the interest of 
examining how changing the traditional risk-neutrality assumption by the, perhaps 
more realistic, risk-aversion one impacts upon the equilibrium of the labour market.
We model a labour market where unemployment coexists with vacancies due to 
the existence of frictions, and where opening a vacancy is a risky business. Risk- 
averse entrepreneurs post higher wages in order to reduce the labour market risk, 
or in other words, to enhance the probability of match with an appropriate worker. 
That increase in wages harms employment by reducing expected profits from 
entrepreneurship. Besides, risk-aversion increases the risk-premium associated to 
starting a business. Both effects result in an equilibrium with less active firms, 
and more unemployment. The calibrations suggest that the impact on the labour 
market equilibrium of moving away from risk-neutrality is large. Hence, risk- 
sharing policies could have important implications for unemployment.
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3.6 Appendix 2
3.6.1 P roof o f proposition 1
We start from expression 14 which gives the equilibrium wage as an implicit 
function of the risk-aversion parameters, productivity and elasticity of the matching 
function. Reordering we get the following expression:
F(w , 7 7 / ,p,a) = ^  a  (e» (?->»)_ l)  +  1 -  e ’- w =  0 (20)
where a  =  ( y ^ ) . The partial derivative of F(w,ryw,'y^p ,a )  with respect to 7 ro 
is given by
— - =  — -  l)  -  wei"*
^ w ' t f
Using the equilibrium expression for wages, 14 and the first order linear approximation 
to e7tuU; around w = 0 : elrx,w ~  1 +  7Ww 4- R2 we get
dF
o—  = < 0 (21)oitITZ7
* The derivative of F(w ,yZJ, /yf,p, a) with respect to the wage is
c l F
^  =  - 7„  +  e’'-” ] (22)
Using the imphcit function rule, we can now write the partial derivative of 
equilibrium wages with respect to workers’ risk-aversion:32
dw* —w
——  = ---------- :-----------< 0 (23)
The next step is to explore how workers’ risk-aversion affects equilibrium queues 
through the impact on wages. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas matching function, the
32The implicit function rule states that given the implicit function F(y ,  X2 , ...) .=  0, 
whenever the explicit function y  =  f ( x  1, X2 ,...) exists, the partial derivatives of /  will be given by 
^  =  — ■jp’. The requirement for existence is the continuity of the derivatives F{ with Fy ^  O.See 
Chiang [1987] , page 210.
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equilibrium queue is given by:
f  e ~ 1 fAP — e “ 7f (A -c )  1 “
 ^ _  |  X [e-7/(>l-c+p-w*) _  e-y/(A-c)j j
The change in the queue as the workers’ risk-aversion and equilibrium wage
varies is then
dq* . ct (  9w *\ e - i f f iA -c + p ^w ')
where A = ^  j  |  > 0 .
3.6.2 P roof o f proposition 2
The partial derivative of F (w ,iw,'yf,p,a) with respect to 7  ^ is given by:
—  =  - !sLa  
d l f  7 /
1 _  e7/(P^0 . ‘
_  +  ( p _ u , ) eT/(P-»)- • (26)I ZU
We can use a first order linear approximation to around the point
p — w = 0:e7/(P-u;) « l + 7 / (p — iy) +  i?2- Substituting back into 26 we obtain
dF
= 7wa (P ~ w ) > 0  (27)
The partial derivative of equilibrium wages to entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion is 
then
= ° (p -« ° )  > o (28)
37™ ae 'T/to-”) +  eT. "  -
Hence, entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion increases equilibrium wages.
We turn now to show the impact, for every wage level, of risk-aversion on the 
risk-premium associated to entrepreneurship. The proof is based on a textbook 
graphical representation of choice under uncertainty. We are considering a model in 
which both entrepreneurs and workers are risk-averse, that is, their utility function 
is increasing with consumption and concave. Equivalently, the certainty equivalent
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of the gamble always lies to the left of the expected value of it, the difference being 
the risk premium. At the initial equilibrium the Vacancy Equilibrium Condition 
is holding, that is, the certainty equivalent of the gamble of opening a vacancy is 
equal to the return from the riskless asset. Entrepreneurs’ risk-aversion implies, 
given the level of wages, an increase in the risk premium. The result is that the 
certainty equivalent of the gamble falls now below the riskless investment return. 
Rational entrepreneurs will prefer to invest their money in the riskless alternative 
so fewer vacancies are open. The equilibrium is restored because fewer vacancies 
imply longer expected queues associated to the posted wages and, therefore, higher 
chances of match which increase the expected utility from opening a vacancy. The 
process continues until the expected utility from the risky asset is again equal to 
the one from the riskless alternative and a new equilibrium is reached, with fewer 
vacancies in the market.
In figure 11 the certainty equivalent of the gamble is denoted by I*. At 
^he initial equilibrium I* =  Ap, where Ap is the outside option. When risk-' 
aversion increases, the utility function becomes more concave and therefore the 
certainty equivalent frills to I*1 which is below Ap. Now the utility associated to 
the riskless asset, u(Ap)7, is above the one associated to the gamble of opening a 
vacancy. Entrepreneurs will invest their wealth in the riskless asset and therefore 
less vacancies will be open.
3.6.3 P roof o f proposition 3
We consider here the impact of productivity, wealth, riskless return, starting cost 
and new entrant risk on the labour market equilibrium. Of all the parameters, 
only productivity affects equilibrium wages. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas matching 
function, all the rest of parameters will impact only on equilibrium queues.
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U(I)
Utility function
u(A-c+p-Wj)
EU(gamble)=
u(Ap)
u(A-c)
A-C I*' I*=Ap EV(gamble) A-c+p-Wj I
Figure 11: Impact of risk-aversion on the equilibrium number of active firms,
holding wages constant
Starting from expression 20 and using again the implicit function rule, the 
derivative of equilibrium wage with respect to productivity is
dp a e rf(p~w  ^ +  dp
that is, an increase in productivity affects positively wages, but less than proportionally.
The derivative of the equilibrium queue with respect to productivity can now 
be written as
dq* n (  d w * \  e ~ 7 /  (A-c+p-w*)
~dp =  Aq7/ ( l  “  ~ d p )0
where r =  p — 1. The partial derivative with respect to the rest of the parameters 
are:
dq* 'yvG
dA ~  _A A [e-i(A-c+p-w) _  e - 7(A-c)] -  0 ( 3 1 )
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0£ _ _ a ______ 7 ^ * ’_________ > 0 (32)
dp ~  X [e—r(-^ —c-i-p—«»*) — e ~i'(/4_c)] ~  y  1 '
dq* ^e~lAp
dc ~  AA f^>~i(A—c-\-p—wm) _  e- 7(A-c)j — ® 03)
dq* —Aqa ,nA\
<34>
with A =  i  |  “ > 0. Note that [e-r(A-c-H~»-) _  e- 7(A-c)] <
0.
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4 Bankruptcy cost and entrepreneurial activity
The previous chapter focused on the effect of risk-aversion on the individual decision 
to become an entrepreneur. We then analysed how changes in the equilibrium 
number of entrepreneurs affected aggregate unemployment and wages. However, 
we did not model the individual occupational choice in the traditional way, i.e. 
as a decision between entrepreneurship and dependent employment; nor did we 
model a financial market. Potential firms were endowed with some initial assets 
that could be invested in a new venture or in a riskless alternative. We saw that 
some kind of wealth insurance could have a sizeable impact on the labour market 
equilibrium when entrepreneurs ai^ e assumed risk-averse. Such possible insurance 
could be provided, for example, by the bankruptcy exemption levels considered in 
the bankruptcy law.
In this chapter we analyse other ways in which the bankruptcy law could impact 
the individual decision to become an entrepreneur, and aggregate employment 
performance. We model the occupational choice of a risk-neutral individual with a 
given entrepreneurial ability and a business idea. The individual chooses between 
becoming an entrepreneur, to which a positive probability of failure is associated, 
and becoming a dependent employee. Failure in the model is costly; the cost is 
determined by bankruptcy law.
There has traditionally been a sharp divide between continental Europe and 
the anglo-saxon countries in their approach to bankruptcy. In Europe, most 
bankruptcy schemes consider the interest of the creditors of greatest importance. 
That is why in all such schemes the right of the creditors to petition for the debtor’s 
bankruptcy is predominant. Under the German bankruptcy scheme, for example, 
debtors used to remain liable for what had not been paid off upon completion 
of the bankruptcy. In other words, early discharge, understood as the release of
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the debtor from personal liability, was not considered in the law. The German 
government reformed the law in 1999 to allow for automatic discharge after seven 
years. The Netherlands, Belgium or France, who had in place similar systems, 
have also reformed the law to change its emphasis from protecting the creditors’ 
interest to protecting the debtors’.
The idea behind the reforms is to give those who have failed honestly a second 
chance by taking away the stigma of failure and reducing its financial cost. That is 
precisely the philosophy of the anglo-saxon countries’ bankruptcy law. In the US, 
for example, automatic discharge of all debts is allowed after 3-4 months. In the 
UK the period was of three years but a recent reform, passed in 2001, decreased 
the discharge period for honest bankrupts to six months.33
The reason for passing reforms aimed at changing the focus of interest of the 
bankruptcy law, from creditors to debtors, is to encourage the small business set­
ups, given the increasing evidence that tough bankruptcy laws prevent individuals 
from undertaking new entrepreneurial ventures. Eurobarometer, for example, 
feported in 2001 that 46% of Europeans, against 25% of North-Americans, agreed' 
with the statement “one should not start a business if there is a risk it might 
fail” 34 Among the risks most feared by Europeans were the risk of losing one’s 
property and the risk of going bankrupt. As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor has found similar percentages when individuals 
have been asked whether the fear of failure was preventing them from starting a 
business. What is behind the bankruptcy law reforms is maybe best described by 
Birch [1987], who wrote in his book “Job Creation in America” :
33In the US that is the case only when the individual has not used the fast discharge clause in 
the previous six years. See N. Huls [1994] and the consultation document issued by the Insolvency 
Service of the Department of Trade and Industry entitled “Bankruptcy, a fresh start.”
34Flash Eurobarometer 134 “Entrepreneurship”. Realised by EOS Gallup Europe upon request 
of the European Comission (Directorate General ”Enterprise”). November 2002.
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One of our greatest strengths as a nation is our capacity for failure.
The grace and even enthusiasm with which we accept those who try 
and fail and come back again. (Birch 1987, page 7)
However, by decreasing creditors’ rights and exposing them to higher risks, 
the reforms of the bankruptcy law undertaken by many European governments 
could jeopardise the access to external finance to young and small companies. 
There is some evidence in this respect. Using a database of 49 countries to 
analyse the relationship between the quality of creditors’ protection and capital 
markets, La Porta et al. [1996] concluded that entrepreneurs had better access to 
external finance in those countries where the legal environment was able to protect 
adequately potential financiers. Galliot [1998] studied the French bankruptcy law 
and arrived to the conclusion that “protecting insolvent firms at the expense of 
creditors has done little to protect employment.” Gropp, Scholz and White [1996] 
have found a significant negative relationship between bankruptcy laws (measured 
as asset exemption level in case of bankruptcy) and interest rates in the different 
states of USA.
Hence reforming the bankruptcy law may be an effective tool to encourage 
new start-ups. But at the same time, it increases creditors’ loss exposure which 
might damage the terms of credit the new entrepreneurs face. That latter effect 
can be of importance in countries where commercial banks are the main source of 
external finance to entrepreneurs. In other countries, like the United States where 
informal and formal venture capital flows are also quite important, the negative 
effect of a lax bankruptcy law upon the credit market might not affect potential 
entrepreneurs’ access to finance.
The purpose of this chapter is to construct a general equilibrium model to 
investigate the impact of reforming the bankruptcy law upon the capital market, 
the equilibrium supply of entrepreneurs, and the aggregate employment. The
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contribution of the chapter is threefold. First, we provide a theoretical framework 
to study the interactions between the bankruptcy law and the capital market. By 
using this we can explore the conditions under which the reform of the bankruptcy 
law jeopardises entrepreneurs’ access to finance most. Second, we analyse the full 
impact that softening the bankruptcy law may have on the equilibrium number 
of entrepreneurs, taking into account the effect of the reform on the incentive 
structure of individuals and on the capital market.
The third contribution of the paper is the analysis of the effect of bankruptcy 
law reform on aggregate employment. For that purpose we assume that job 
creation of entrepreneurs is proportional to their capital investment. Softening the 
bankruptcy law will increase the number of new entrepreneurs but induce each of 
them to invest less in capital and, therefore, to create less employment. We show 
that initial decreases of the cost of failure have a positive impact on aggregate 
employment because the initial encouragement of entrepreneurship offsets any 
other effects of the reform. But further reductions of the cost of failure can 
decrease employment because, even when there are more new entrepreneurs, each' 
of them employs less people. Hence we find a “Laffer-like” relationship between 
employment and cost of failure.
The model presented in this chapter belongs to the literature on occupational 
choice with heterogenous agents started in the late 70s, where the supply of 
entrepreneurs was determined by the distribution of individual characteristics. 
Kihlstrom and Laffont [1979], for example, explained the supply of entrepreneurs 
in an economy where agents differed in risk-aversion. Banerjee and Newman [1993], 
Boadway et al. [1998] and Chamley [1983] explained the individual occupational 
choice by means of the income distribution. In Lucas [1978] the classical theory of 
the firm is reconciled with the fact that firms of different size co-exist in the same 
industry. Lucas explained this by the existence of an exogenous distribution of
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managerial talent that divided the population between employers and employees 
and, then, determined optimally the allocation of resources across employers. We 
take from Lucas [1978] the existence of an exogenous distribution of managerial 
talent across the population but assume that it affects only the individual decision 
to become an entrepreneur, not the size of the firm. The size of firms will depend 
solely on the cost of capital, which is endogenous in this model.
Contrary to what it was assumed in the previous chapter, individuals have 
no initial endowments which means that they have to resort to external finance 
sources to start their businesses. The seed capital will be provided by a competitive 
banking sector with imperfect information about the true probability of success 
of start-ups. That assumption is thought to accommodate the lack of credit or 
production history of start-ups, which makes it difficult for banks to assess their 
real success probabilities. We claim that, in this context, the bankruptcy law will 
affect the optimal behaviour of banks and therefore the terms of credit available 
to entrepreneurs. The reason is that softening the law will encourage less able 
individuals to try and start a new venture. Banks will observe an increase in the 
average probability of default and react by increasing the interest rates they charge 
upon the entrepreneurial loans.
The inclusion of a credit market with asymmetric information implies that 
we use some of the tools and concepts of the literature initiated by Stiglitz and 
Weiss [1981] on credit market imperfections. They suggested that consumer credit- 
constraints exist because some consumers would default in a credit market with 
imperfect information.35 The decision to default is not modelled in their paper: it 
is assumed that some consumers exogenously default. In this chapter, however, the
35There is a large literature on credit market imperfections. See the survey by Jafee and Stiglitz 
in the Handbook on Monetary Economics, volume II [1990]. See also Bester [1985], Blinder and 
Stiglitz [1983], Greenwald et al. [1984], Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986], Stiglitz and Weiss [1983, 
1987] and Riley [1987].
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decision to default is endogenous. However, note that this paper is not intended 
to be a contribution to that body of literature. We just borrow some of its tools 
to study the impact of the bankruptcy law on employment, which is the ultimate 
objective of the chapter.
The first section of the chapter describes the basics of the model, the occupational 
choice of individuals between entrepreneurship and dependent work, how the banks 
set optimally their interest rates and the equilibrium. Section 2 studies some 
comparative statics. Section 3 analyses the impact of the bankruptcy law upon 
aggregate employment and, finally, section 4 concludes.
4.1 The m odel
Consider an economy with an entrepreneurial and an established-firms or contract 
sector. We will start assuming that the entrepreneurial sector is at its simplest: 
entrepreneurs are self-employed and do not hire people. This simplification allows 
us to focus on the impact of the bankruptcy law on the number of entrepreneurs. 
Later on, when we turn to the analysis of how the reform of the law affects aggregate ’ 
employment, it will be assumed that entrepreneurs decide optimally how many 
people to employ. The contract sector is competitive so anyone who wants to find 
a job can do so.
There is a continuum [0,1] of individuals who differ in their entrepreneurial 
ability, or managerial talent, as Lucas [1978] called it. This is defined as the talent 
to manage the production from a business idea of random quality. Two individuals 
with the same idea but different entrepreneurial abilities will get different returns 
from production; it will be always higher for the person better suited to be an 
entrepreneur. Entrepreneurial ability is only relevant for entrepreneurs; it does 
not play any role if the individual opts to become a dependent employee.
There is a large number of identical banks endowed with one unit of capital
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(deposits are not model). Banks have two investment possibilities: risky entrepreneurial 
projects and some investment with known return. The former axe risky because 
there is a positive probability of default on entrepreneurial loans, after which the 
bank loses its investment. Since individuals have no initial assets, banks cannot 
ask for collateral to reduce the risk of default.36
4.1.1 Occupational choice o f individuals
Let
Ey(a, p, x) = ap +  E x  (35)
be the expected production value of an individual who decides to become an 
entrepreneur. Production is dependent on three variables. The first input is the 
individual’s entrepreneurial ability, denoted by a  and distributed uniformly across 
the population [0,1]. Managerial talent is assumed to be private information. We 
assume as well that it is a necessary input to production in the entrepreneurial 
sector.
The second component is an observable and verifiable general productivity 
parameter, denoted by p G (g, p) . The general productivity can be thought to 
change with the economic cycle, increasing in booms and decreasing in recessions.
It could also be thought to characterize the technology level of an economy. The 
introduction of such a parameter reflects the macroeconomic framework in which 
the entrepreneur operates, a key element in the success or failure of any new 
venture.
The last component of the production function is a business idea whose idiosyncratic 
quality level is taken from a random distribution G(x) with support [0,1]. One 
can think about a pool of available ideas from which the entrepreneur picks one at
36The results would still apply if we assumed that some potential entrepreneurs have insufficient 
initial wealth.
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random. The quality of the idea does not depend on the entrepreneurial ability of 
the individual (that is, the distribution G(x) is the same for all individuals). But, 
given a certain business idea, an individual more talented should be able to get a 
higher production return. The value of a; is revealed to the entrepreneur only after 
production has started. To simplify proofs and exposition we will assume hereafter 
that the random variable x follows a uniform distribution.
To become an entrepreneur the individual requires one unit of seed capital, 
which is provided by a commercial bank. That assumption accommodates the 
well established fact in the small business finance literature that the main external 
source of finance of start-ups is debt.37
Bank and entrepreneur write the following contract:
Bank Entrepreneur
Failure 0 - /
Success R y ( a ,p ,x ) - R
In case of entrepreneurial failure, to be defined below, the bank recovers nothing 
and the entrepreneur pays an exogenous failure cost / ,  which is the policy parameter 
of the model. We are aware that the assumption that banks are not able to 
recover anything from the production might look extreme. The reason behind 
such assumption is simplicity. We have included in the appendix the equilibrium 
expression for the more realistic case in which the banks are able to recover the 
value of the production, but further analytical work is not possible given the 
complexity of the expressions. On the other hand, this extreme assumption serves 
to emphasize that banks run the risk to lose their investment if the entrepreneur 
fails. It could imply that the investment is specific to the entrepreneur so nobody 
else is able to get any value out of it, or that the capital fully depreciates.
37See for example Berger and Udell [1998].
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The failure cost the entrepreneur has to pay could also be somehow transferred 
to the bank'. In that case the results of the model would be reinforced: a reduction 
in the failure cost (for example, an increase in the asset level exempt from the 
bankruptcy procedure) would affect negatively both the mix of loan applicants 
and the asset value the bank is able to hold after liquidation of the firm. In this 
model we focus only in the former effect but keeping in mind that results would 
hold under other more complex assumptions on firm liquidation rules.
In case of success, the bank recovers the principal plus the interest rate, denoted 
by R, and the entrepreneur keeps the residual return from production.
Entrepreneurial failure
Entrepreneurial failure occurs when the value of production is not high enough 
to repay the bank loan, thus when y(a,p, x) < R. Similarly, entrepreneurial 
success takes place when y(a,p,x) > R. Therefore the reservation quality of the 
entrepreneurial idea, x , is given by y(a,p,x) = R. Using the production function 
in 35:
x(a) = R — ap (36)
Since the value of production is assumed to increase continuously with x , the 
entrepreneur with ability a will “succeed” whenever x > x(a) and will pay the 
failure cost contemplated in the bankruptcy law when x < x(a).
Recall that the value of x is only known after production has taken place. But 
each individual of ability a  can calculate her probability of failure simply as the 
probability that x < x(a), that is, as the cumulative probability G(x(a)). Given 
36, the probability of failure will be lower the more able is the entrepreneur, the 
higher is the general productivity of the economy where the entrepreneur operates, 
and the lower the interest rate set by the bank.
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The marginal entrepreneur
The expected value of becoming an entrepreneur for an individual of entrepreneurial 
ability a  operating in an environment p can now be defined as
Vs (a ,p ) =  /  [y(a,p,x) -  R ] d x -  f x  (37)
Jx
That is, in case of success the entrepreneur gets the value of production after 
repaying the debt to the bank. If the entrepreneur fails, she will pay the failure 
cost set by the bankruptcy law, which is denoted by / .
Using the explicit production function given in 35 and a uniform distribution 
for x , 37 becomes
Ve (a,p) = Q — | t e ^ - - f x ( a )  (38)
where the super-index e indicates expected value from entering entrepreneurship.
Recall that entrepreneurial ability does not play any role if the individual 
chooses instead to become a dependent employee. We assume that individuals 
are homogeneous with respect to their productivity as an employee. Thus the 
income of employees will be given by the exogenous parameter w,
V c{p) = w >  0 (39)
where the super-index c is an indicator for the contract sector. Given the failure 
cost, the general productivity, the wage as an employee, and the expected interest 
rate, a rational individual of ability a will choose to become an entrepreneur if and 
only if
V ‘ (c ,p )> V c(p) (40)
The marginal entrepreneur, whose entrepreneurial ability will be denoted by 
a(p), is the individual who, given p, is indifferent between both career choices:
V‘ (a,p) =  v c(p) (41)
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Then the occupational choice of individuals can be described as follows:
Proposition  4 Given the general productivity parameter p, all individuals with 
a  >  a(p) will find it optimal to become entrepreneurs. Equivalently, all individuals 
with a  < a ( p )  will choose optimally to become dependent employees.
Proof. The return to dependent employment does not vary with entrepreneurial 
ability. Therefore, it is enough to show that the value of entrepreneurship increases 
monotonously with entrepreneurial ability to prove that there is a unique cut-off 
for every p :
= p [ ( l - x ( a ) )  + / ] > 0 i / p > 0  -  
Figure 12 shows graphically the occupational choice of individuals.
e
v  (p)
V (a,p)
«  til da
Figure 12: Occupational Choice
Since entrepreneurial ability is assumed to be a necessary input in production, 
when a  =  0 the probability of failure takes the maximum value, one. In that
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case, the payoff from entrepreneurship is just —/ ,  the cost of failure. Given p, 
as managerial talent increases so does production and the probability of success, 
which explains the convexity of the curve. The intersection between the value of 
entrepreneurship and the value of dependent employment gives the ability of the 
marginal individual a for each p.
Hence the marginal entrepreneur defines the supply of entrepreneurs for every 
p, which is given by l — a(p). An increase in a(p) is to be interpreted as a decrease 
in the supply of entrepreneurs. Using 38, 39 and 41, a(p) can be calculated as a 
function of the parameters of the model and the interest rate:3839
a{p) = - { R - F }  (42)
P
with
,---------------------- dFF  =  (1 +  / )  -  y/(l +  / ) 2 +  2w -  1; and —  < 0
df
If we ignored the impact on the capital market, it is easy to see that softening 
Jhe bankruptcy law would unambiguously increase the number of entrepreneurs.' 
But if a decrease in the bankruptcy cost is followed by an increase in the interest 
rate, which is what we prove next, the positive impact of softening the law is lessen 
by the negative effect that the increase in the cost of capital has on the supply of 
entrepreneurs. Expression 42 highlights quite clearly the opposite effects on the 
number of individuals who decide to become entrepreneurs of both, an increase in 
the interest rate and a decrease in the cost of failure /.
38The positive root of the solution has been chosen because we expect the relationship between 
a and w  to be positive, i.e. the higher the pay as dependent employee, the lower the number of 
entrepreneurs.
39Prom 41 we know that in equilibrium the pay of dependent employees has an upper bound: 
w < \ .
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4.1.2 Banks
A representative bank in this economy is endowed with one unit of capital and 
has two investment choices. The first choice is some investment delivering a 
fixed and known return. The second alternative is to invest the unit of capital 
in the entrepreneurial project of an individual operating in a certain economic 
environment of general productivity p, observable by the bank.
The bank cannot observe the entrepreneurial ability of individuals, nor their 
random draw of x. The bank only observes the production value of the entrepreneur 
after the company has been set up and production started. As a result, the 
bank does not know the exact probability of success of each loan applicant. That 
assumption is thought to accommodate the lack of credit or production history of 
start-ups, which makes it difficult for banks to assess their real success probabilities. 
However, the bank knows that all potential entrepreneurs have an entrepreneurial 
ability larger or equal than the one of the marginal entrepreneur. Thus, the 
expected probability of success of a loan applicant can be calculated as the average 
probability of success, within a framework of general productivity p, conditional 
on a > a(p):
E  [1 -  x(a)\a  > S(p)] =  ~  (43)
where 1 — x(a) is the probability that an individual of talent a  picks up an idea 
with quality enough to succeed, i.e. with x > x(a). Profit maximization in a 
competitive banking sector implies that the return from the unit of capital of the 
bank in all alternative investments should be equal:
R E  [1 — x(a) |a > a(p)] = p (44)
where p is the total return to the bank if the unit of capital was invested in the 
alternative to the entrepreneurial loan. Using the production function given in
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35 and a uniform distribution for a, the expected probability of success of a loan 
applicant operating in an economic framework p can be written in the following 
way:
E  [1 -  x(a)\a > a(p)] =  1 -  fl +  P 0  +  (45)z
Using the expression above for the expected probability of success, and the 
equilibrium expression given in 44, the equilibrium interest rate as a function of 
the parameters of the model and the marginal entrepreneur’s ability a(p) is given 
below:40
*  =  -2 <
i + ^ + p {  i + s w ) y  - 4 P (46)
4.1.3 Equilibrium  
Definition
An allocation is a tuple {(3(a),R,V,P} where (3(a) is a set of occupational 
choices of individuals with entrepreneurial ability a; R = R(/3(a)) G R+ is the set 
©f associated gross interest rates; V = V(p(a)) : R+ —+ R  is the expected value 
associated to the occupational choice of an individual of ability a  and P = P (R ) : 
R+ —> R + is the bank’s profit associated to a commercial loan with gross interest 
rate R.
An equilibrium is an allocation {(3*(a), R*,V*, P*} such that:
• Given the expected interest rate R e((3(a)), the expected value associated 
to the occupational choice of an individual with entrepreneurial ability a  is 
maximized:41
V*((3(a))>V((3(a))
40We have chosen the negative root to ensure that the relationship between the interest rate 
and the alternative investment return is positive.
41Rational expectations imply that expectations are correct in equilibrium: R e( 0 ( p , a ) )  =  
R *(P (p , a :))
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with equality if (3(a) G 0*(a) and
V*(fi(a)) =  max |/~ [y(a,p, x) -  tfe(/?(a:))] dx -  /a,iuj
•  Given the occupational choice of the individual (3(a), the bank’s profits are 
maximized:
P W (< * ) ) )  > p
with equality if R((3(a)) G R*((3(a)) where p is the alternative investment 
return and
P(R(/3(a))) =  R((3(a))E[( 1 -  x /a  > S(p)].
Individuals choose occupation so, given the expected interest rate on commercial 
loans, their expected utility is maximized. Given the occupational choice of individuals, 
banks set an interest rate such that their profits are maximized, which implies 
equality across the returns from the alternative investment choices.
The equilibrium values for the two endogenous variables of the model, the 
ability of the marginal entrepreneur and the interest rate, will be given by the 
solution to the system of simultaneous equations 42 and 46:
a  (p)* =
R• = j i l +P(1 +25(P)>:' - ] l ( l +  P{1 +25(P),) )2 -
Substituting the value of a(p) from expression 42 into 46 and rearranging, the 
equilibrium interest rate can be written as a function of the parameters of the 
model:
^ * = | l  +  £^ V  +  (47)
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where F = (1 4- /)  — y /(1 + f ) 2 + 2w — 1. Substituting back into the expression 
for the marginal entrepreneur:
3(p)* =  -  <
P
1 +  2— i - V  + - 2 p - F (48)
Thus 47 and 48 are the intersection values of the interest rate and marginal 
ability reaction functions in the (a(p),R) space, shown in figure 13. Given all the 
parameters of the model and the expected interest rate, all individuals with a > 
a(p) will decide optimally to become entrepreneurs. The higher the interest rate, 
the higher the required entrepreneurial ability which explains the positive slope 
of the schedule a(R) in the figure. Given the occupational choice of individuals, 
the bank sets optimally the interest rate so the expected returns of all alternative 
investments is equal. The more able are the people who asks for a loan to become 
entrepreneurs (the higher a), the lower the optimal interest rate. Hence the 
negative slope of the schedule R(a) in the figure. The equilibrium will be found 
at the intersection of both reaction functions.
t
Proposition 5 There is a range of parameters for which the equilibrium always 
exists.
Proof. See appendix 3. ■
Before moving to the comparative static analysis, we would like to direct your 
attention to two partial equilibrium results of some interest.
Firstly, we study how the optimal interest rate charged by banks vary with the 
economic cycle. One would expect that banks charge lower interest rates during 
economic booms. Or using a different interpretation of p, we expect that banks 
charge lower interest rates when financing ventures in high productivity economic 
sectors. Although we prove below that it is always the case, we have to keep 
in mind that higher general productivity also means that less entrepreneurially
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Figure 13: Equilibrium: occupational choice and capital market
able individuals can afford successfully to be entrepreneurs. Hence the expected 
probability of success of an individual operating in an environment of high p will 
be high if the direct impact of general productivity on the expected return exceeds 
the “negative” impact on the required entrepreneurial ability of entrepreneurs.
Proposition 6 Banks find it optimal to charge lower interest rates to entrepreneurs 
during economic booms or in high productivity economic environments.
Proof. Ifrom expression 47,
d R _  1 
dp 2
Secondly, we examine the optimal behaviour of a bank when facing an excess of 
credit demand: will the bank ration credit, as in Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]?; or will 
the bank optimally raise the interest rates to restore the equilibrium? In Stiglitz 
and Weiss [1981], loan applicants with the same expected return from production,
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observable by the banks, differed in their riskiness (in a mean-preserving spread 
sense), which was not observable. For every interest rate, there was a critical 
value of riskiness such that all individuals with projects of equal or larger riskiness 
decided to apply for a loan. As the interest rate increased so did that critical value 
of riskiness, or in other words, adverse selection took place. Given a sufficiently 
high interest rate, the negative effect due to the adverse selection dominated so 
banks facing an excess of credit demand decided optimally to ration credit.
In this chapter banks can observe the general productivity of the environment 
where the entrepreneur operates. Given that macroeconomic framework, the expected 
return from production, and probability of default, will vary depending on the 
entrepreneurial ability of the entrepreneur, which is not observable by banks. For 
every interest rate there is a critical, or marginal as we have called it in this model, 
value of entrepreneurial ability above which individuals will apply for a loan. As 
the interest rate increases, so will the ability of the marginal individual so the least 
able individuals drop from the credit market, which is different from Stiglitz and 
JVeiss [1981]. What is also different is that the probability of default or riskiness of' 
the project for the bank is endogenous in this model. As the interest rate increases, 
so does the probability of default of the loan applicants who decide to apply for a 
loan.
We proceed to examine how the expected return from investing one unit of 
capital in an entrepreneurial project (the return times the probability of repayment) 
changes following an increase in the interest rate. Starting from the expression of 
the expected probability of success of a loan applicant, given in 45, the expected 
return of the bank after investing in an entrepreneurial loan is, after substituting 
the value of a(p) given in 42, simply:
/  v - F \  R2 E(return) = R I 1 +  —-— J — —
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Hence like in Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], the expected return of the bank has 
an inverted-1 U shape when plotted against the interest rate, with a maximum at 
R  =  1 +  2— . From that point on, the bank will choose to ration credit rather than 
to increase the interest rate in a situation of excess of demand for credit because 
further increases of the interest rate would reduce its expected profit. The reason, 
however, is different from Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]. In this model there is not 
adverse selection (there is “positive” selection if such a term can be accepted) but 
the probability of default is endogenous. Hence as the interest rate increases, so 
does the probability of default, which decreases the expected profit from the bank.
For a sufficiently high level of interest rate that negative effect dominates.
Note that the turning point after which the bank chooses optimally to ration 
credit occurs at higher interest rates the higher the general productivity parameter 
p. Hence credit rationing seems to be a problem only in low productivity environments.
P roposition 7 There is ap, or general productivity parameter, above which banks 
will not ration credit.
Proof. It is enough to see that L im itp^^R  = oo, where R  =  1 +  ■
This result can explain the observed credit rationing of entrepreneurs in low 
productivity environments in a situation of excess of credit demand. Entrepreneurs 
in high productivity sectors, or during economic booms, do not face credit constraints.
Stretching a bit the concept, we could also think of p as the general education 
level of an individual, something observable by banks which increases the individuals’s 
expected value of production for every a. In that case this result would imply that 
highly educated individuals will face less credit constraints than low educated 
ones. There is not much empirical evidenoe on this topic, however, Parker and 
Van Praag [2003] using a sample of some 400 Dutch managers to study the effect 
of education and capital aocess on firm performance, find that one extra year of
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education decreases capital constraints by 1.4%.42
Figure 14 shows how the bank’s return from investing the capital in an entrepreneurial 
project changes as the interest rate increases, and how the whole schedule shifts 
as the general productivity increases.
Profit Bank
Figure 14: Bank’s profit and interest rate 
We are now in position to start exploring some comparative statics.
4.2 Comparative Statics
We start this section with the analysis of the interaction between the bankruptcy 
law and the capital market.
The direct effect of the reduction of the cost of failure is to encourage entrepreneurship, 
as it was shown previously. The reason is that people who, given their entrepreneurial 
ability, before did not consider it an optimal choice, now that failure is cheaper 
find entrepreneurship worthwhile. Less entrepreneurially able individuals are now
42Capital constraints are measured as the difference between the capital wanted by managers 
and the capital actually obtained.
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thinking about starting their own business. For that they need a loan from a bank. 
The bank observes this change in the optimal occupational choice of individuals 
and acts consequently changing its interest rate. The optimal response will be to 
increase the interest rate to compensate for the decrease in the expected probability 
of repayment of the loan:
Proposition  8 When the bankruptcy cost decreases, the optimal response of banks 
is to raise the interest rate on entrepreneurial loans. The bankruptcy law will have 
a smaller impact on the capital market: (1) the lower the alternative investment 
return p; (2) the higher the pay for dependent employees w; and (3), the higher the 
productivity pammeter p.
Proof. See Appendix 3. ■
Thus, we can provide a theoretical framework able to explain the negative 
relationship between the strictness of the bankruptcy law and the interest rate 
found in the empirical studies of Grant [2000] and Gropp et al. [1996] in the United 
States, and La Porta et al. [1997] in a cross-country analysis. Landier [2001] find a 
similar mechanism to explain the negative effect of the cost of failure on interest 
rates. Landier argues that there is imperfect information in the labour and capital 
markets about the ability of failed entrepreneurs who are trying to make a new 
start. If there exists the belief that failed entrepreneurs have low managerial talent, 
then banks will raise their interest rates to all second-time entrepreneurs. That 
will discourage potential new entrepreneurs so the equilibrium, like in this chapter, 
will be characterised by a low level of entrepreneurial activity.
This model shows that the negative impact of the reform of the bankruptcy 
law on interest rates is small when the bank alternative return is low, when the 
employees’ wage is high, and when the general productivity of the economy where 
the entrepreneur operates is high. The first condition is quite intuitive. The 
reason behind the second one is the following: when the pay of employees is 
very high, a reduction in the cost of failure does not attract more individuals
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into entrepreneurship and, therefore, does not change substantially the expected 
probability of default on entrepreneurial loans. Hence the banks will not change the 
interest rates. With respect to the third possibility, one has to keep in mind that 
the general productivity parameter increases the expected probability of success for 
every given level of entrepreneurial ability. Then it is easy to understand that, even 
when the entrepreneurial ability of loan applicants decreases, the good moment of 
the cycle, which is one of the possible causes of a high p, induces banks to moderate 
their response to the reform of the bankruptcy law.
Once the interaction between the bankruptcy law and the capital market has 
been explored, we can proceed to study the full impact of reforming the bankruptcy 
law on the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs, taking into account the reaction 
of banks to the change in legislation. We depart from expression 42, which we 
reproduce here for convenience:
5(p) = - { i l - F }
P
The total effect of decreasing the cost of failure on the equilibrium number of 
entrepreneurs will be given by the total derivative of a(p) with respect to /  :
da(p) 1 <dR 11 dF „
df p \ d F  ) df .
because ^  < 0 and, as we have shown in the proof of proposition 8, 0 < ^  < 1-
Hence, after a reduction in the cost of failure, the equilibrium number of 
entrepreneurs always increases (a(p) will decrease). But the effect is smaller than 
what we might expect from a partial equilibrium analysis. The reason is that the 
reform of the law results in banks raising optimally the interest rates they charge 
to entrepreneurial loans. That negative effect of the reform of the law is captured 
by the first term of the brackets above (recall that everything is multiplied by 
which changes its sign). The second term in the brackets of the total derivative
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reflects the direct impact that softening the bankruptcy law has on entrepreneurial 
activity: to encourage more people to start their own business by decreasing the 
cost of failure.
Figure 15 shows graphically how the combination of both effects impacts upon 
the equilibrium:
R
a  tilda (R)
R *
R(a tilda)
a  tilda«----  a  tilda*
Figure 15: The effect of reducing the cost of failure on the equilibrium
The economy is in the initial equilibrium at A. The government decides to 
decrease the cost of failure in order to foster entrepreneurship. That shifts the a(R)  
schedule to the left: for every interest rate, the marginal entrepreneurial ability 
decreases. If the credit market was not affected the new equilibrium would be found 
at B. But the entrance of “worse” entrepreneurs into de credit market demanding 
a loan to start a business decreases the expected probability of repayment so banks 
raise optimally the interest rates. That is a movement along the schedule R ( a ) 
until the new equilibrium is reached in C.
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When would softening the bankruptcy law be most effective at encouraging 
entrepreneurship? The answer is, when the direct impact of the reform on the 
incentive structure of the individual is large and the resulting increase of interest 
rates is small.
From the expression of the total derivative of a(p), we see that the direct 
impact of the law is large when the productivity parameter is low: those who have 
much to lose, that is, with a high probability of failure, will be the most benefited 
from the law reform. Given the model, the probability of failure decreases with 
the parameter p. Hence, the policy reform will be most successful at encouraging 
entrepreneurship, given the reaction of the banks, in low productivity environments. 
It is true that, as we have seen in proposition 6, a low productivity framework will 
induce banks to raise their interest rates, dampening some of the positive impact 
of the law on entrepreneurship. But the first effect of p will always be dominant.
When the wage one receives as a dependent employee is not too competitive, 
any reform aimed at fostering entrepreneurship will have great success. Hence a 
decrease in the cost of failure in low-income countries might have a large effect o n ' 
entrepreneurial activity.
Finally, given all the rest of the parameters, the response of banks to the 
reform will be moderated as long as the alternative investment return p is low. 
Thus, monetary policy might have an important effect on the real economy, at 
least in the short-term, by lessening the reaction of banks to the change in the 
bankruptcy law. Another possibility for the reform of the bankruptcy law to be 
effective is to offer potential entrepreneurs access to alternative sources of finance, 
such as micro-credits by the Government or informal investment.
Apart from the bankruptcy law, captured by the parameter / ,  the model 
considers other exogenous parameters of interest. We proceed to analyse briefly 
their impact on the equilibrium of the model.
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Proposition 9 An increase in the pay of employees will reduce the equilibrium 
supply of entrepreneurs and interest rate. An increase in the alternative investment 
return for the bank (or deposit interest mte) will increase the interest mte and 
reduce the equilibrium supply of entrepreneurs. During booms, or in a macroeconomic 
framework of high productivity, the equilibrium interest rate will be lower and the 
supply of entrepreneurs larger.
Proof. See Appendix 3. ■
A raise in the pay dependent employees receive, w, has a direct impact on the 
individual’s occupational choice. For every interest rate, less individuals will find 
it optimal to become entrepreneurs. Only the very able, that is, the ones expecting 
a high return from entrepreneurship, will Still opt for the entrepreneurial venture. 
Therefore only the more able individuals will apply for a loan, which explains the 
decrease in the equilibrium interest rates.
An increase in the alternative return p, or in the deposit interest rate, will 
increase the optimal interest rate independently on the occupational choice of 
individuals. Higher interest rate means that the probability of default increases 
so only the very able individuals will still decide to open a business. That is the 
reason for the decrease in the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs.
Lastly, an increase in the general productivity p fosters entrepreneurship for 
two, reinforcing reasons. Given any interest rate, the improvement in the macroeconomic 
framework where the entrepreneur operates will increase the probability of success 
of entrepreneurial ventures. Therefore more individuals will opt to become entrepreneurs. 
Banks know that individuals with lower entrepreneurial ability are now trying to 
get seed capital for a venture. But the positive impact of the general productivity 
parameter on the probability of success dominates, which explains that banks 
will respond reducing the interest rate. That decrease will encourage further 
entrepreneurial activity. Therefore an increase in the general productivity seems 
to be the most effective way to foster entrepreneurship, according to the model
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presented in this chapter. Policy intervention aimed at increasing the R&D level 
of a country (with fiscal incentives for private firms or directly from the public 
sector) is therefore justified.
4.3 T he effect o f th e  bankruptcy law on aggregate em ploym ent
Let us now extend the model in a very simple way in order to explore the impact 
of the bankruptcy law reform on aggregate employment. So far we had assumed 
that all entrepreneurs demanded one unit of capital, and apart from their own job, 
they were not creating any further employment. We will relax that assumption 
now to allow entrepreneurs to demand K(R)  units of capital, with < 0.
Furthermore, we will assume that each entrepreneur hires a number of employees 
proportional to the capital investment. The analysis of this section implies that the 
entry and employment decision are separated. Or in other words, the individual 
decides first to start a new company, and then, how much employment to create.
The profit from the new venture is very simply written as:
• n(a,p,x,K(R))  = ap -\-K(R)x — K(R)R  (49)
Capital has been assumed to depend only on the expected quality of the idea 
and on the cost of capital, contrary to Lucas [1978]. Then banks cannot learn 
the managerial talent of the individuals by the amount of capital they demand, 
which is sometimes the case in the credit market imperfection literature. We do 
not intend to explore further those issues but rather to focus on how employment 
changes with the bankruptcy law.
The capital investment that will maximise expected profits will be the same 
for all individuals (the distribution of a: is not dependent on the entrepreneurial 
ability of the individual) and given by:
= *  (so)
dR x K }
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Equilibrium aggregate employment in this economy will be equal to the total 
number of entrepreneurs multiplied by the capital investment (employment creation) 
of each one of them:
AE( f )  =  ( l - a ( f y ) K ( R ' ( f ) )  (51)
where the dependance with respect to the failure cost has been made explicit.
Let us assume a very simple explicit function for K ( R ) :
- i r l i T i  (5 !)
Now the aggregate equilibrium employment can be written as follows, using 
the equilibrium expression for a given in 42 and 52:
A E { F ) = - P + R ^ n t F  (53)
v '  p 1 + R(F) v '
where F  = (1 +  / )  — ^/(l +  f ) 2 +  2w — 1. What is left now is to see how the 
aggregate employment, shown in the expression above, changes with the failure 
cost. In order to be able to do so, the best strategy is to rewrite 53 only in terms 
of R(F).  We have shown somewhere above that there is a univocal relationship 
between R  and F: to every value of F  we can find a corresponding value of R  
and to every value of R  a corresponding value for F. Hence we will plot aggregate 
employment against the interest rate R  but keeping in mind that it is equivalent 
to plotting employment against F, and of course, against /.
The equilibrium interest rate was given in 46:
R{F)-{1 + ^ ) - \ j {1 + LT~) ~ 2p
Let us define z = 1 + Then, rearranging from 46 and using the definition 
of 2,
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Plugging the value of F  found above back into 53, we find a pretty simple 
expression for aggregate employment as a function of R(F) :
2 (2 + 2p)R(F)— 2R2(F) — 2p
A E ( R ( F ) ) - p R{55)
That function, shown in figure 16, can be plotted as a curve with one maximum 
for a positive value of R (and therefore of F  and of / ,  the failure cost).
A g g r e g a te
E m p lo y m en t
R (F)
d e c r e a s e  in c o s t  o f  failure
Figure 16: Aggregate employment and bankruptcy cost
We will show in the appendix that the maximum is reached at R >  1, that is, 
for reasonable values of the parameters.
As we move to the right in the figure, the interest rate increases. That implies 
that F  increases and, therefore, that the cost of failure /  decreases. Initial 
reductions of the cost of failure increase overall employment because, in spite of 
decreasing the investment per entrepreneur, the equilibrium number of start-ups 
grows enough to compensate. After a certain point, further reductions in the cost of
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failure will decrease aggregate employment because, even with more entrepreneurs 
in the economy, each of them is creating very little employment and that effect 
dominates.
Proposition 10 There is a positive value of cost of failure for which aggregate 
employment is maximised. Countries where the bankruptcy law imposes a higher 
failure cost do not have enough entrepreneurs in equilibrium. Countries where the 
bankruptcy law is very lax suffer from very high interest rates due to the lack of 
protection to creditors and, therefore, have low capital investment and employment 
creation.
Proof. See Appendix 3. ■
To get an idea of the magnitude of the changes, we have calibrated the model. 
The equilibrium supply of entrepreneurs and the interest rate are given by 42 and 
46 respectively:
a ( p f  = ~ { R ' - F }
V
and the capital function is given by 52 and aggregate employment by 55:
2
i +  R( f )
AFOXFV  -  ^ +  2p)R(F) — 2fl2(F) — 2p AE{R(F)) -  p R{FH1+R{F))
The parameter values for the wage of dependent employees, general productivity 
and alternative investment return satisfy all the conditions required for the existence 
of equilibrium and are provided in the table below:
Parameter values 
w 0.25
p 2
p 1.5
Table 24: Parameter values
K{R)
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The purpose is to see how the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs, interest 
rate, capital investment and aggregate employment vary with the policy parameter 
of the model, / ,  which will vary from 0 to oo.
/ 0 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 oo
S (/) 0.45 0.455 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50
R( f ) 1.19 1.14 1.10 1.07 1.05 1.02 1
KU) 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.99 1
(1 - a ( f ) ) K { f ) 0.5005 0.507 0.513 0.514 0.5096 0.505 0.5
Table 25: Calibration: impact of bankruptcy cost
Upon observation of the table above, several things become dear. First, everything 
behaves as expected: reducing the bankruptcy cost increases the number of entrepreneurs, 
increases the interest rate and decreases the capital investment. Aggregate employment 
increases at first but then decreases again, being the cost of failure that maximises 
employment equal to one. The second observation is that the impact of the cost 
©f failure on all those variables is quite small. Employment, for example, increases 
only about 2.8% when the cost of failure is reduced from infinite to its maximising 
value, one. The interest rate, as expected since in case of entrepreneurial failure the 
bank does not recover anything in this model, increases quite a bit when the cost 
of failure decreases. However that increase in the interest rate is not so reflected 
in a reduction of the capital investment which could be due, at least partially, to 
the explicit function assumed in the model.
4.4 Conclusions
Governments across the world are considering softening their respective bankruptcy 
laws in order to encourage entrepreneurial activity. However, banks are the primary 
source of external capital to start-ups. Loosening the bankruptcy law decreases
133
creditors’ protection and, therefore, results in a rise of the interest rates banks set 
on entrepreneurial loans.
This chapter introduces a relatively simple equilibrium general model to study, 
first, the relationship between the bankruptcy law and the capital market, second, 
the full impact of the bankruptcy law upon the supply of entrepreneurs and, 
third, its impact on aggregate employment. We find that the optimal reaction 
of banks facing a reform aimed at softening the bankruptcy law is to increase 
interest rates. That increase will be smaller the higher the general productivity 
of the economy or economic sector where the entrepreneur operates, the lower the 
alternative investment return of the bank, and the lower the wage in the contract 
or established firms sectors.
Starting from the assumption that entrepreneurs do not create employment in 
order to evaluate the overall impact of the law reform on the equilibrium number 
of start-ups, we find that softening the bankruptcy law has a direct positive effect 
on the equilibrium supply of entrepreneurs for each given interest rate level. But 
the capital market is also affected by the law reform. The resulting raise in the 
interest rates does hamper the impact of the reform on entrepreneurial activity. 
But still, we prove that the overall effect of the law reform on start-ups is positive, 
although small as the calibrations show.
To explore the impact of the law upon aggregate employment we assume that 
each entrepreneur’s employment creation is proportional to her capital investment. 
Since softening the bankruptcy law increases the interest rates, capital investment, 
and employment creation, will be jeopardised. We find that there is a “Laffer- 
type” relationship between aggregate employment and the cost of failure. Initial 
reductions of the cost of failure increase overall employment because, in spite of 
decreasing the investment per entrepreneur, the equilibrium number of start-ups 
grows enough to compensate. After a certain point, further reductions in the cost of
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failure will decrease aggregate employment because, even with more entrepreneurs 
in the economy, each of them is creating very little employment and that effect 
dominates.
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4.5 A ppendix 3
4.5.1 Equilibrium under more complicated liquidation rules
Let us assume that the entrepreneur and the bank write the following contract:
Bank Entrepreneur
Failure y(a,p,x) - /  .
Success R y ( a , p , x ) - R
Hence, in case of failure the value of production is transferred to the bank and 
the entrepreneur pays the failure cost imposed by the bankruptcy law. In case of 
success the bank receives the gross interest rate R  and the entrepreneur retains 
the residual profit.
The occupational choice of the individuals does not vary, hence the equilibrium 
marginal individual will be given by
P
What changes is the optimal interest rate for the bank. Recall that the banking 
sector is competitive. Therefore the equilibrium will be characterised by the 
equalisation of returns across investments:
RE [I — x(ct)\a > 5(p)] +  {y\a > a(p);x < x ( a ) } E  \x(a)\ct > a(p)] =  p (56)
The expected return from the entrepreneurial project will be the sum of the 
expected probability of success, given that the individual decides to start a venture, 
times the return in case of success, plus the expected probability of failure, again 
conditioned on the individual having decided to become an entrepreneur, times 
the return in case of failure. That latter return is the value of production under 
two conditions: that the individual is an entrepreneur, which puts a lower bound 
in his entrepreneurial ability; and that the quality of the idea was so low to lead
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the individual to entrepreneurial failure. Mathematically, the value of production 
recovered by the bank in case of failure is
v x-. f~da fx dx(ap + x) p + R . .
{y\a > a(p); x  < x(a)} = ---- f ----— ------ --- —r— (57)(1 — a) x Z
Plugging 57 into 56, and using 45 for the expected probability of success, 56 
becomes
* - {  l +  £ +  ^ } - ^ { l  +  2 + £ M } 2 - 2 , - ^ i ± ^  (58)
The new equihbrium would be given by expressions 42 and 58, which are clearly 
not too friendly to work with.
4.5.2 Proof o f proposition 5
We reproduce here once again the equihbrium values of the model:
S(p)* =
P
r * =
For the equihbrium to exist, it is required in the first place that the squared 
root above is positive. That imposes a lower bound on p: p > 2y/2p — 2 +  Fm 
where FM is the maximum value that F  can take (at /  =  0).
The equihbrium expression of R  is a parabola whose central axis is parallel'to 
the x-axis and with the minimum at R = yjp. Since we have taken the negative 
root, the crossing-point or equihbrium should happen in the decreasing part of the 
parabola. However, there could be some cases where that is not the case. To avoid 
that, we have to impose that R < yjp —► p > 3y/2p — 2 + Fm . That lower bound 
dominates the other previous one.
Next we impose further restrictions to ensure that the equilibrium interest rate 
and entrepreneurial abihty are within the bounds assumed in the model: R > 1
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and a € [0,1]. Setting R* > 1 leads to the condition p < 2p — 1. The condition 
that a* > O' is trivial since a(p)* =  ^ {iT — F } with i?* > 1 and F < 1. To ensure
that a* < 1 it is required that p > — FM.
To summarise, for an equilibrium to exist (and in the decreasing branch of the 
parabola) we require that
p > 3 \[2p — 2 +  Fm (^9)
For the equilibrium values to fall into the assumed boundaries we require that
p < 2p — 1 and (60)
P > j f p  -  FM
All conditions are compatible for low values of F. Hence, we can find a range 
of parameters for which the equihbrium exits and is reasonable.
4.5.3 P roof o f proposition 8
We are trying to find the sign of the total derivative:
dR dRdF  
~df =  dF df
with
f  = 1 - 7 = i i i ---------- <°
1 y ( i  +  / )  ,+ 2iu — i
From 47,
d R _  1 
dF ~  2
1 +  ^
- 1 + - -------------------— i L > > 0I vo+W^J
Therefore, ^  < 0.
Moreover, it can be proven that 0 < ^  < 1. To see that, note that the 
derivative will be largest when 1 +  is smallest. We know from the proof of the
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previous proposition that p — F  is bounded from below: p — F  > 3y/p — 2. Then 
1 4- > 1 +  3v^~2 =  2 yfp* Substituting that lower bound back into the total
derivative above we find its maximum value:
3 7770 dR 1 
0 < d F < 2 i - 1 s/lp-lp.
It is easy to see that the derivative converges to zero (no impact of the law on 
the capital market) as p tend to zero, w tends to its maximum and as p tends to 
infinite.
4.5.4 Proof o f proposition 9
The equilibrium marginal entrepreneur and interest rate are given respectively by 
the expressions below:
where F = (1 +  / )  — >/(l +  f ) 2 +2w — 1.
The dependent employment return w only affects directly a(p)*, with
da(p)* i ^ > 0
dw p dw .
Therefore an increase in w implies that less individuals, only the most able ones,
will attempt to open a business. That will result in a reduction of the probability
of default on bank loans, and, therefore, in the fall of the optimal interest rate.
Equivalently, p only impacts directly on the interest rate. The impact on the
supply of entrepreneurs will be through the change in the cost of finance. As p
increases, so does the interest rate:
When the . seed capital becomes more expensive, fewer people decides to open 
a firm. ■
Lastly, an increase in p will encourage more individuals to become entrepreneurs, 
at any given level of interest rate. But as proposition 4.2 showed, in spite of that 
the expected average probability of entrepreneurial success increases w ithp so the 
banks will reduce the interest rates.
4.5.5 Proof o f proposition 10
We depart from the expression of aggregate employment as a function of the 
interest rate:
AE(R(F)) = 2 (2 + 2P) f l ( F ) - 2f l % F ) - 2/,
W  ’’ p R(F) (1+R(F))
Prom the expression above we can start bounding aggregate employment finding
its values for the limit values of R. Then,
Limitr_q AE(R(F)) = — oo 
LimitR-yoo AE(R(F)) — —2
Hence the curve will have one or more maxima. We study the behaviour of the
curve in between both values by taking the derivative with respect to R  :
p dAE(R(F)) =  —2(2 +  p)R2 + 4Rp +  2p 
2 dR(F) ~  R 2( l+R?)
— _  p +  yV2 +  /a(2 + p)
2 +p
Hence the function has only one maximum to be found at R. Plugging the 
lower bound of the parameter p given above: p > into the expression of R  to 
find its lower bound, it is easy to see that R > 1. That means that the aggregate 
employment maximum does exist for reasonable values of the parameters. Finally, 
using the relationship between R  and F  and between F  and /  we can work out 
the corresponding values for which aggregate employment is maximum.
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